@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+---
+'@objectstack/objectql': patch
+'@objectstack/driver-sql': patch
+---
+
+refactor(objectql)!: the per-table platform-object tenancy ledger is retired, and the tenant-audit mute is decided by the object's schema (ADR-0131 D13)
+
+Clause-②: no (narrowing)
+Metadata-protocol: none
+
+<!-- adr-0087: not-required (runtime-export-retired @objectstack/objectql#PLATFORM_OBJECT_TENANCY, @objectstack/objectql#classifyPlatformObjectTenancy, @objectstack/objectql#isPlatformObjectOutOfTenantAuditScope, @objectstack/objectql#tenantScopedPlatformObjects, @objectstack/objectql#PlatformObjectTenancy, @objectstack/objectql#PlatformObjectTenancyEntry) The only author-reachable removals are runtime exports of `@objectstack/objectql`'s published entry: the ledger table, its three predicates and its two types. No key of any metadata schema is removed, renamed or re-shaped, so there is nothing for `objectstack migrate meta` to rewrite and no tombstone. -->
+
+**BREAKING** for code that imports the ledger from `@objectstack/objectql`. It ships as `patch` because the metadata protocol is unchanged.
+
+- **`@objectstack/objectql`: the ledger and its exports are gone.** No write ever depended on them: since ADR-0131 C8 stage 8b, every object with a tenant column takes the system-write rule's derived organization or is refused, whatever its name. The ledger's last reader was the engine's tenant-audit mute, which is now read off the schema.
+- **The tenant-audit mute (`bypassTenantAudit` on an elevated write) is decided by the object's schema alone.** An elevated write is muted only when the object has no tenant column (`tenancy.enabled: false`, `systemFields.tenant: false`, or no tenant field) or is federated. A platform-namespace object that has a tenant column is now audited like any other. On a walled posture (`isolated` / `group`), an elevated write on such an object that reaches the SQL driver with no `tenantId` therefore prints the `[tenant-audit]` warning, once per object and operation. Nothing a write touches changes: the mute only decides whether that line is printed.
+- **`@objectstack/driver-sql`: the `[tenant-audit]` warning names both readings.** It no longer tells every unscoped write to "pass tenantId". A write that belongs to one organization should run in that organization's context. A write that crosses organizations on purpose, such as a platform admin the organization wall exempts or a system job over every organization, needs no fix, and the caller declares it with `bypassTenantAudit: true`. The line still starts `[tenant-audit] <op> on tenant-scoped object "<object>"`, and its metadata is unchanged.
+
+**Migration** for code that imported the ledger:
+
+- FROM `PLATFORM_OBJECT_TENANCY` TO the object's schema: an object is in tenant scope when `resolveTenantFieldName(schema)` (still exported) answers non-null. `scripts/platform-object-tenancy-census.json` in the repository lists, per platform object, the schema declaration that puts it outside.
+- FROM `classifyPlatformObjectTenancy(name)` TO `resolveTenantFieldName(schema) !== null` on the registered schema.
+- FROM `isPlatformObjectOutOfTenantAuditScope(name)` TO `resolveTenantFieldName(schema) === null`.
+- FROM `tenantScopedPlatformObjects()` TO the census's `reach: "in"` rows.
+- FROM `PlatformObjectTenancy` TO delete it: no classification exists any more.
+- FROM `PlatformObjectTenancyEntry` TO delete it: no classification exists any more.
@@ -199,3 +199,31 @@ describe('#5262 — the verdict is taken LIVE, never frozen at first write', ()
     expect((driver as any)._multiTenantMode).toBeUndefined();
   });
 });
+
+// ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// [ADR-0131 D8 / D13] What the line PRESCRIBES. Under a wall, an exempt
+// platform admin's cross-organization predicate update or delete reaches this
+// driver with no `tenantId` on purpose — the wall lifted the scope — and so
+// does a write that simply lost its organization. The driver cannot tell the
+// two apart, so the line must name the remedy for each and must not tell the
+// first to "pass tenantId", the one change that would break it.
+describe('the [tenant-audit] line names both readings and the remedy for each', () => {
+  it('a wall-exempt cross-organization updateMany is not told to pass tenantId', async () => {
+    setEnv({ posture: 'isolated' });
+    await writeWithoutTenant('x1');
+    warns = [];
+    // The exempt admin's shape: a predicate update with no tenantId.
+    await driver.updateMany('account', { where: { name: 'x1' } } as any, { name: 'renamed' });
+
+    const line = warns.find((w) => w.msg.includes('[tenant-audit] updateMany'));
+    expect(line, 'positive control: the unscoped updateMany must warn').toBeDefined();
+    expect(line!.msg).not.toMatch(/pass tenantId/i);
+    // The deliberate reading and its declaration.
+    expect(line!.msg).toContain('crosses organizations on purpose');
+    expect(line!.msg).toContain('a platform admin the organization wall exempts');
+    expect(line!.msg).toContain('bypassTenantAudit:true');
+    // The lost-organization reading and its remedy.
+    expect(line!.msg).toContain("run it in that organization's context");
+    expect(line!.meta).toMatchObject({ object: 'account', op: 'updateMany', tenantField: 'organization_id' });
+  });
+});
@@ -15980,6 +15980,15 @@ export class SqlDriver implements IDataDriver {
    * Throttled to one warning per `${object}:${op}` so background workers
    * don't spam the log. Set `options.bypassTenantAudit = true` (or env
    * `OS_TENANT_AUDIT=0`) to silence intentionally.
+   *
+   * The line names BOTH readings, because this driver cannot tell them apart:
+   * an unscoped write here is either one that lost its organization (fix:
+   * run it in that organization's context) or one the organization wall
+   * lifted the scope from on purpose — an exempt platform admin's
+   * cross-organization update or delete arrives exactly so, with no
+   * `tenantId` (ADR-0131 D8). Telling that second write to "pass tenantId"
+   * prescribes the one change that would break it, so ⛔ the remedy sentence
+   * never addresses the write as if it were only the first kind.
    */
   protected auditMissingTenant(
     object: string,
@@ -16008,7 +16017,11 @@ export class SqlDriver implements IDataDriver {
     if (this.tenantAuditWarned.has(key)) return;
     this.tenantAuditWarned.add(key);
     this.logger.warn(
-      `[tenant-audit] ${op} on tenant-scoped object "${object}" without options.tenantId — writes will not be tenant-isolated. Pass tenantId via ExecutionContext or set bypassTenantAudit:true to silence.`,
+      `[tenant-audit] ${op} on tenant-scoped object "${object}" without options.tenantId — the statement is not confined to one organization. `
+        + 'If the write belongs to one organization, run it in that organization\'s context (an ExecutionContext carrying its organization); '
+        + 'the row\'s own organization column does not scope an update or a delete. '
+        + 'If it crosses organizations on purpose (a platform admin the organization wall exempts, or a system job over every organization), '
+        + 'nothing needs fixing: the caller declares it with bypassTenantAudit:true, which also silences this line.',
       { object, op, tenantField: field },
     );
   }
 
@@ -220,9 +220,6 @@ import {
   SystemWriteOrganizationRequiredError,
   ORGANIZATION_OBJECT,
 } from './tenancy/system-write-organization.js';
-// [#13491] The per-object tenancy inventory that replaced the blanket
-// namespace exemption — the ONE reading both narrowed gates consult.
-import { isPlatformObjectOutOfTenantAuditScope } from './tenancy/platform-object-tenancy.js';
 import { resolveTenancyPosture } from '@objectstack/types';
 import {
   normalizeTenancyPosture,
@@ -7536,15 +7533,18 @@ export class ObjectQL implements IObjectQLEngine {
     const hasTenant = tenantScope !== undefined;
     const hasTz = execCtx?.timezone !== undefined;
     const isSystem = execCtx?.isSystem === true;
-    // [#13491] The object's tenancy classification — the reading the mute
-    // below narrows by (ADR-0131 C8 stage 8b retired its other reader, the
-    // system-insert exemption, under every posture). An object
-    // with no tenant field is out by construction; a platform object is out
-    // unless the inventory adjudicated it tenant-scoped.
+    // [ADR-0131 D9/D13] The tenant-audit's scope is the object's SCHEMA: a
+    // tenant column (the registered schema's, as `resolveTenantFieldName`
+    // reads it) on an object that is not federated. That is the same reading
+    // the system-insert rule takes, and there is no second, per-table one —
+    // the #13491 ledger that used to narrow this by name retired with D13. An
+    // object is outside the audit only by declaring itself outside the
+    // machinery (`tenancy.enabled: false`, `systemFields.tenant: false`, no
+    // tenant field, `external`), which `scripts/platform-object-tenancy-census.json`
+    // enumerates for the platform namespaces.
     const isTenantAuditInScope =
       resolveTenantFieldName(objectSchema) !== null &&
-      !isFederated &&
-      !isPlatformObjectOutOfTenantAuditScope(object);
+      !isFederated;
     const preserveAudit = (execCtx as any)?.preserveAudit === true;
     if (!hasTx && !hasTenant && !isSystem && !hasTz && !preserveAudit) return base;
     const opts: any = base && typeof base === 'object' ? { ...base } : {};
@@ -7563,9 +7563,9 @@ export class ObjectQL implements IObjectQLEngine {
       opts.timezone = execCtx!.timezone;
     }
     if (isSystem && opts.bypassTenantAudit === undefined && !isTenantAuditInScope) {
-      // [#13491] The isSystem mute NARROWED by the object's tenancy
-      // classification, in the same stroke as the guard above and by the same
-      // reading (2026-08-31 ruling, execution point 1).
+      // [#13491 → ADR-0131 D13] The isSystem mute, cut by the object's
+      // schema alone (2026-08-31 ruling, execution point 1: the OBJECT decides,
+      // never the caller's flag).
       //
       // It used to mute EVERY elevated write, whatever the object was. The
       // census cited in commit e49d98896's message measured what that cost: 135 of 175 write call sites
@@ -7575,10 +7575,10 @@ export class ObjectQL implements IObjectQLEngine {
       // were found by a person reading call sites.
       //
       // What still mutes: an object with no tenant field at all (nothing to be
-      // unscoped from — the driver would exit at `resolveTenantField` anyway),
-      // and a platform object the inventory classified `global` or has not
-      // adjudicated. What no longer mutes: a tenant-scoped object, platform
-      // namespace or not. A caller that means it still passes
+      // unscoped from — the driver would exit at `resolveTenantField` anyway)
+      // and a federated one. What does not: any object with a tenant column,
+      // platform namespace or not — a name prefix, or a hand-kept list of
+      // names, decides nothing here. A caller that means it still passes
       // `bypassTenantAudit: true` explicitly and is honoured above — this
       // branch only fills in a value nobody supplied.
       //
 
@@ -553,18 +553,6 @@ export {
   DEFAULT_TENANT_FIELD,
 } from './tenancy/system-write-organization.js';
 
-// [#13491] The per-object tenancy inventory for the platform namespaces — the
-// 2026-08-31 ruling's replacement for the wholesale `sys_ / cloud_ / ai_`
-// exemption. Exported so the inventory is readable (and testable) from outside
-// the engine; the ledger itself is hand-adjudicated, never derived.
-export {
-  PLATFORM_OBJECT_TENANCY,
-  classifyPlatformObjectTenancy,
-  isPlatformObjectOutOfTenantAuditScope,
-  tenantScopedPlatformObjects,
-  type PlatformObjectTenancy,
-  type PlatformObjectTenancyEntry,
-} from './tenancy/platform-object-tenancy.js';
 export type {
   SystemWriteOrganizationDecision,
   SystemWriteRefusalReason,