@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+---
+'@objectstack/plugin-security': patch
+---
+
+fix(plugin-security): a delegated administrator's position assignment is judged on every permission set the assignment grants, the set of the position's own name included
+
+Clause-②: no
+
+- **The rule (ADR-0090 D12, as amended 2026-10-17).** The sets a position carries are every set an assignment of it grants: the names its definition's `permissionSets` lists and, while the authorization resolver folds held position names into the requested set names, the permission set of the position's own name when the catalog holds one. The organization-level branch already counted that set. The delegated branch now does too, through the same helper.
+- **What a delegate is now refused.** A `sys_user_position` insert, update or delete by an `adminScope` holder whose allowlist does not cover the position's own-name set is refused `403 PERMISSION_DENIED`. The message names the set and says it is the set of the position's own name. An own-name set that carries an `adminScope` is held to strict containment like any other distributed set. A delegatable position whose own-name set carries an `adminScope` can no longer be self-delegated.
+- **What the delegable-scope report offers.** `GET /api/v1/security/my-delegable-scope` no longer lists a position for a delegate whose allowlist misses that position's own-name set, so the picker offers only what the write admits.
+- **Unchanged.** A position with no permission set of its own name is judged on its listed sets alone, as before. Tenant-level administrators and the organization-level branch are untouched, and the resolver's fold itself is not changed. To keep a delegate able to assign such a position, add the own-name set to the scope's `assignablePermissionSets`.
@@ -1349,3 +1349,152 @@ describe('DelegatedAdminGate — organization administrators (ADR-0090 D12 as am
     });
   });
 });
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// [ADR-0090 D12, amended 2026-10-17] The delegated walk counts the own-name set
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * The sets a position carries are every set an assignment of it grants: the
+ * names its definition lists and, while the resolver folds held position names
+ * into the requested set names, the permission set of the position's own name.
+ * The delegated branch judges all of them — in the allowlist check, in strict
+ * containment, in the self-delegation rule against handing out administration
+ * and in the delegable-scope listing.
+ *
+ * Catalog: `rep_pos` → [field_user] beside a plain set named `rep_pos`;
+ * `lead_pos` → [field_user] beside a set named `lead_pos` that carries the wide
+ * delegate's own scope; `clerk_pos` → [field_user] with no set of its name;
+ * `duty_pos` (delegatable) → [field_user] beside a set named `duty_pos` that
+ * carries an adminScope; `duty_plain` (delegatable) → [field_user].
+ */
+function makeOwnNameHarness() {
+  const tables: Record<string, any[]> = {
+    sys_business_unit: [
+      { id: 'bu_hq', name: 'hq', parent_business_unit_id: null },
+      { id: 'bu_east', name: 'east', parent_business_unit_id: 'bu_hq' },
+      { id: 'bu_es', name: 'east_sales', parent_business_unit_id: 'bu_east' },
+    ],
+    sys_user_position: [
+      { id: 'held_rep', user_id: 'u_east_1', position: 'rep_pos', business_unit_id: 'bu_es' },
+      { id: 'boss_duty', user_id: 'u_boss', position: 'duty_pos' },
+      { id: 'boss_plain', user_id: 'u_boss', position: 'duty_plain' },
+    ],
+    sys_business_unit_member: [{ id: 'm1', business_unit_id: 'bu_es', user_id: 'u_east_1' }],
+    sys_user: [{ id: 'u_east_1' }, { id: 'u_boss' }, { id: 'u_deleg' }],
+  };
+  const matches = (row: any, where: any): boolean =>
+    Object.entries(where ?? {}).every(([k, v]) => {
+      if (k.startsWith('$')) throw new Error(`fake driver: unsupported operator ${k}`);
+      if (v && typeof v === 'object' && Array.isArray((v as any).$in)) return (v as any).$in.includes(row[k]);
+      return row[k] === v;
+    });
+  const ql: any = {
+    tables,
+    async find(object: string, opts: any) {
+      const rows = (tables[object] ?? []).filter((r) => matches(r, opts?.where));
+      return typeof opts?.limit === 'number' ? rows.slice(0, opts.limit) : rows;
+    },
+    async findOne(object: string, opts: any) {
+      return (tables[object] ?? []).find((r) => matches(r, opts?.where)) ?? null;
+    },
+  };
+  const scope = (allow: string[]) => ({ businessUnit: 'east', includeSubtree: true, manageAssignments: true, assignablePermissionSets: allow });
+  const WIDE_ALLOW = ['field_user', 'rep_pos', 'lead_pos'];
+  bindTestSecurityCatalog(ql, {
+    permissions: [
+      { name: 'field_user', objects: { crm_account: { allowRead: true } } },
+      { name: 'rep_pos', objects: { crm_account: { allowRead: true, allowEdit: true } } },
+      { name: 'lead_pos', objects: {}, adminScope: scope(WIDE_ALLOW) },
+      { name: 'duty_pos', objects: {}, adminScope: scope(['field_user']) },
+    ],
+    positions: [
+      { name: 'rep_pos', permissionSets: ['field_user'] },
+      { name: 'lead_pos', permissionSets: ['field_user'] },
+      { name: 'clerk_pos', permissionSets: ['field_user'] },
+      { name: 'duty_pos', permissionSets: ['field_user'], delegatable: true },
+      { name: 'duty_plain', permissionSets: ['field_user'], delegatable: true },
+    ],
+  });
+  const SETS: Record<string, any[]> = {
+    // Allowlists the sets the positions LIST, not their own-name sets.
+    narrow: [{ name: 'east_admin', objects: {}, adminScope: scope(['field_user']) }],
+    // Also allowlists the own-name sets.
+    wide: [{ name: 'east_admin_wide', objects: {}, adminScope: scope(WIDE_ALLOW) }],
+    member: [{ name: 'member_default', objects: {} }],
+  };
+  const gate = new DelegatedAdminGate({
+    ql,
+    resolveSets: async (c: any) => SETS[c?.principal ?? ''] ?? [],
+    now: () => T0,
+  });
+  const ctxOf = (principal: string) => ({ principal, userId: `u_${principal}`, positions: [] });
+  const assign = (principal: string, position: string) => gate.assert({
+    object: 'sys_user_position', operation: 'insert', context: ctxOf(principal),
+    data: { user_id: 'u_east_1', position, business_unit_id: 'bu_es' },
+  });
+  const offered = async (principal: string) =>
+    (await gate.describeDelegableScope(SETS[principal] as any, ctxOf(principal))).assignablePositions.sort();
+  return { gate, tables, ctxOf, assign, offered };
+}
+
+describe("DelegatedAdminGate — a delegate is judged on the permission set of the position's own name (ADR-0090 D12 as amended 2026-10-17)", () => {
+  let n: ReturnType<typeof makeOwnNameHarness>;
+  beforeEach(() => { n = makeOwnNameHarness(); });
+
+  it("refuses an assignment whose own-name set is outside the allowlist — 403 PERMISSION_DENIED, naming the set", async () => {
+    const err = await deniedOf(() => n.assign('narrow', 'rep_pos'));
+    expect(err.message).toMatch(/position 'rep_pos' distributes permission set 'rep_pos' \(the permission set of the position's own name.*not in the scope's allowlist/);
+    expect(err.details).toMatchObject({ position: 'rep_pos' });
+  });
+
+  it('CONTROL: admits the same assignment for a delegate whose allowlist covers the own-name set too', async () => {
+    const row: any = { user_id: 'u_east_1', position: 'rep_pos', business_unit_id: 'bu_es' };
+    await expect(n.gate.assert({ object: 'sys_user_position', operation: 'insert', data: row, context: n.ctxOf('wide') }))
+      .resolves.toBeUndefined();
+    expect(row.granted_by).toBe('u_wide');
+  });
+
+  it('a position with no own-name set in the catalog is judged on its listed sets alone, as before', async () => {
+    await expect(n.assign('narrow', 'clerk_pos')).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('removing an assignment is judged on the same sets: the narrow delegate may not evict one granting a set outside its allowlist', async () => {
+    const err = await deniedOf(() => n.gate.assert({
+      object: 'sys_user_position', operation: 'delete', options: { where: { id: 'held_rep' } }, context: n.ctxOf('narrow'),
+    }));
+    expect(err.message).toMatch(/permission set 'rep_pos'.*not in the scope's allowlist/);
+    await expect(n.gate.assert({
+      object: 'sys_user_position', operation: 'delete', options: { where: { id: 'held_rep' } }, context: n.ctxOf('wide'),
+    })).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('an own-name set carrying an adminScope is held to strict containment, allowlisted or not', async () => {
+    const err = await deniedOf(() => n.assign('wide', 'lead_pos'));
+    expect(err.message).toMatch(/granting set 'lead_pos' would hand out an adminScope not strictly contained by yours/);
+  });
+
+  it('the delegable-scope listing offers exactly the positions the write admits', async () => {
+    expect(await n.offered('narrow')).toEqual(['clerk_pos', 'duty_plain']);
+    expect(await n.offered('wide')).toEqual(['clerk_pos', 'duty_plain', 'rep_pos']);
+    for (const principal of ['narrow', 'wide']) {
+      const offered = await n.offered(principal);
+      for (const position of ['rep_pos', 'lead_pos', 'clerk_pos', 'duty_pos', 'duty_plain']) {
+        const admitted = await n.assign(principal, position).then(() => true, () => false);
+        expect(admitted, `${principal} · ${position}`).toBe(offered.includes(position));
+      }
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('a delegatable position whose own-name set carries an adminScope cannot be self-delegated', async () => {
+    const delegation = (position: string) => n.gate.assert({
+      object: 'sys_user_position', operation: 'insert', context: { userId: 'u_boss', positions: [], principal: 'member' },
+      data: { user_id: 'u_deleg', position, delegated_from: 'u_boss', valid_until: iso(T0 + 5 * DAY), reason: 'cover' },
+    });
+    const err = await deniedOf(() => delegation('duty_pos'));
+    expect(err.message).toMatch(/position 'duty_pos' distributes the admin set 'duty_pos' \(the permission set of the position's own name.*administration cannot be self-delegated/);
+    expect(err.details).toMatchObject({ position: 'duty_pos', permissionSet: 'duty_pos' });
+    // CONTROL: the same holder delegates a delegatable position with no such set.
+    await expect(delegation('duty_plain')).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+  });
+});
@@ -25,7 +25,8 @@
  *   what one of their scopes fully approves: the right kind of action
  *   (manageAssignments), inside their BU subtree, handing out only
  *   allowlisted sets, with STRICT containment whenever the granted set itself
- *   carries an adminScope. The rows it governs are the two assignment tables
+ *   carries an adminScope. A position assignment hands out every set it
+ *   grants — the definition's list and the set of the position's own name. The rows it governs are the two assignment tables
  *   (`sys_user_position`, `sys_user_permission_set`); the binding and set
  *   authoring rows retired with the catalog row objects (ADR-0131 D3), so a
  *   position's sets and a set's definition are written through the metadata
@@ -261,6 +262,17 @@ interface BoundSet {
   adminScope?: unknown;
 }
 
+/**
+ * What a refusal adds when the set it names is the one of the position's own
+ * name: the position's definition need not list it, so the reader is told why
+ * it was judged at all.
+ */
+function ownNameNote(positionName: string, setName: string): string {
+  return setName === positionName
+    ? " (the permission set of the position's own name, which an assignment of the position also grants)"
+    : '';
+}
+
 function rowsOf(opCtx: any): any[] {
   const d = opCtx?.data;
   if (Array.isArray(d)) return d;
@@ -598,8 +610,8 @@ export class DelegatedAdminGate {
     const placeableBusinessUnitIds = [...new Set(placing.flatMap((h) => [...h.subtree]))];
 
     // A position is assignable when at least ONE placing scope allowlists
-    // every set it distributes — exactly `assertAssignmentWrite`'s test,
-    // containment check included.
+    // every set it distributes — the set of its own name included — exactly
+    // `assertAssignmentWrite`'s test, containment check included.
     const assignablePositions: string[] = [];
     if (placing.length > 0) {
       for (const positionName of await allPositions()) {
@@ -792,6 +804,9 @@ export class DelegatedAdminGate {
    * the set of the position's own name, when the catalog holds one. `null`
    * when the catalog does not hold the position. An unreadable catalog throws
    * (`AuthzStoreUnavailableError`) and the write is refused with it.
+   *
+   * The one answer to "which sets does this position carry" for both branches:
+   * the delegated walk ({@link setsBoundToPosition}) reads it too.
    */
   private async setsCarriedByPosition(positionName: string): Promise<string[] | null> {
     const catalog = this.catalog();
@@ -1006,11 +1021,12 @@ export class DelegatedAdminGate {
         deny(`position '${positionName}' is not delegatable — set delegatable: true on the position to allow it`, { position: positionName });
       }
 
-      // 6. A delegatable position must not distribute administration.
+      // 6. A delegatable position must not distribute administration — through
+      //    any set an assignment of it grants, the own-name set included.
       const boundSets = await this.setsBoundToPosition(positionName);
       for (const b of boundSets) {
         if (parseMaybeJson((b as any).admin_scope ?? (b as any).adminScope)) {
-          deny(`position '${positionName}' distributes the admin set '${b.name}' — administration cannot be self-delegated (D12 containment)`, { position: positionName, permissionSet: b.name });
+          deny(`position '${positionName}' distributes the admin set '${b.name}'${ownNameNote(positionName, b.name)} — administration cannot be self-delegated (D12 containment)`, { position: positionName, permissionSet: b.name });
         }
       }
     }
@@ -1100,10 +1116,11 @@ export class DelegatedAdminGate {
           if (!prevBu) return 'the existing assignment is unanchored (no business_unit_id) — only a tenant admin may modify it';
           if (!s.subtree.has(String(prevBu))) return `the existing assignment's business unit '${prevBu}' is outside the delegated subtree`;
         }
-        // Every set the position distributes must be allowlisted.
+        // Every set the position distributes must be allowlisted — the set of
+        // the position's own name included ({@link setsBoundToPosition}).
         for (const bound of boundSets) {
           if (!s.scope.assignablePermissionSets.includes(bound.name)) {
-            return `position '${positionName}' distributes permission set '${bound.name}', which is not in the scope's allowlist`;
+            return `position '${positionName}' distributes permission set '${bound.name}'${ownNameNote(positionName, bound.name)}, which is not in the scope's allowlist`;
           }
           const contained = this.assertScopeGrantContainment(bound, held, /*dryRun*/ true);
           if (contained) return contained;
@@ -1387,14 +1404,21 @@ export class DelegatedAdminGate {
   }
 
   /**
-   * [ADR-0131 D3/D4] The permission sets a position distributes: the names its
-   * DEFINITION carries (`PositionSchema.permissionSets`), each with the
-   * `adminScope` of the catalog's definition of that name — the binding the
-   * authorization resolver grants through, read from the same security
+   * [ADR-0131 D3/D4, ADR-0090 D12 as amended 2026-10-17] The permission sets a
+   * position distributes, as the delegated walk judges them: every set an
+   * assignment of it grants — {@link setsCarriedByPosition}, the one answer the
+   * organization-level branch reads too: the names its DEFINITION carries
+   * (`PositionSchema.permissionSets`) and, while the resolver folds held
+   * position names into the requested set names, the permission set of the
+   * position's own name when the catalog holds one — each with the
+   * `adminScope` of the catalog's definition of that name. That is the binding
+   * the authorization resolver grants through, read from the same security
    * catalog, never from a `sys_position_permission_set` junction row (which
-   * grants nothing since the resolver stopped reading it). So the D12
-   * containment and the assignable-positions listing judge exactly what an
-   * assignment will grant.
+   * grants nothing since the resolver stopped reading it). So the allowlist
+   * check, the D12 strict containment, the self-delegation rule against
+   * distributing administration and the assignable-positions listing all judge
+   * exactly what an assignment will grant — a set granted by the position's
+   * name alone included.
    *
    * A name the definition carries that the catalog does not hold is still
    * returned, with no `adminScope`: it grants nothing today, but the binding is
@@ -1409,12 +1433,9 @@ export class DelegatedAdminGate {
   private async setsBoundToPosition(positionName: string): Promise<BoundSet[]> {
     const catalog = this.catalog();
     if (!catalog || !positionName) return [];
-    const position = await catalog.resolve('position', positionName);
-    const names = Array.isArray(position?.definition.permissionSets)
-      ? (position.definition.permissionSets as unknown[]).filter((n): n is string => typeof n === 'string' && n !== '')
-      : [];
+    const names = (await this.setsCarriedByPosition(positionName)) ?? [];
     const out: BoundSet[] = [];
-    for (const name of new Set(names)) {
+    for (const name of names) {
       const set = await catalog.resolve('permission', name);
       out.push({ name, ...(set?.definition.adminScope ? { adminScope: set.definition.adminScope } : {}) });
     }