@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+---
+'@objectstack/rest': minor
+---
+
+fix(rest)!: the API-description endpoints refuse an anonymous caller
+
+Clause-②: no (narrowing)
+
+<!-- adr-0087: not-required (no-migration-prescription) A runtime authorization narrowing at the two API-description routes that RestServer.registerOpenApiEndpoints mounts (the document and its viewer page), not a metadata change. No spec key, export, option, config field, response field or stored shape is removed, renamed or re-shaped, and the document a signed-in caller receives is unchanged, so there is no tombstone and nothing for `objectstack migrate meta` to rewrite. What narrows is which callers the two routes serve: a caller with no session is now refused with the shared anonymous-deny 401, a session held by an auth policy gets that policy's 403, and a signed-in caller is served as before. The other categories are closed on facts: the package publishes (not unpublished); no ADR-0087 id covers these routes and this diff adds none (not registered / already-registered); and no published interface or type changes (not runtime-interface-only / type-surface-only). -->
+
+**BREAKING** (an accept-set narrowing), shipped as `minor` under the launch-window convention for breaking changes.
+
+`RestServer.registerOpenApiEndpoints` mounts the API-description endpoints: the document and its viewer page. Until now they served a caller with no session, while the data and metadata routes beside them refused one. ADR-0056 D2 denies anonymous callers by default.
+
+- **Refused now:** a caller with no session, with `401` and code `UNAUTHENTICATED` — the same body the data routes answer. Both handlers check before any other work, so the refusal does not say whether a document is bundled.
+- **Also refused:** a session held by an auth policy (an expired password, enforced MFA) gets that policy's `403`, as on every other protected route.
+- **Unchanged:** a signed-in caller is served the same document and the same viewer page as before. The viewer page loads the document from the browser with the browser's session, so a signed-in browser sees the viewer work as before.
+
+What changes for you. If you published the API description to readers without an account, have them sign in first, or publish a static copy of the document instead.
@@ -284,6 +284,16 @@ export const AUTHZ_CONFORMANCE: AuthzPrimitive[] = [
     // which stays in the shrink-only baseline.
     covers: ['analytics:domains/analytics.ts:anonymous-gate', 'dispatcher-domain:route-ledger.ts:/analytics'],
     note: 'Ungated, an unauthenticated caller — carried to the domain as the guest envelope — was answered 200 on every analytics face on a stock boot, with aggregates over arbitrary objects, while the record doors and the dataset door on the same boot answered it 401. Gating the DOMAIN rather than each face keeps a newly added analytics face from arriving ungated. This row is the door half only: a non-system caller who resolves NO permission set being granted object admission and an unscoped read by that absence is a security-layer question for every door at once, deliberately not copied into service-analytics; it is tracked on its own card. The per-face unit pins (anonymous 401 with the service never consulted, malformed body and empty slot still 401, signed-in control unchanged) live in runtime/domains/analytics-anonymous-deny.test.ts.' },
+  // #22430 — the API-description endpoints, under the ruling recorded on #22146
+  // (the API-description endpoints refuse an anonymous caller with 401).
+  { id: 'anonymous-deny-api-description', summary: 'anonymous-deny on the API-description endpoints (the document and its viewer)', state: 'enforced',
+    enforcement: 'rest/rest-server.ts registerOpenApiEndpoints — BOTH handlers (the document and its viewer page, on every base the server mounts) open with enforceAuth (→ shouldDenyAnonymous) as their first act, ahead of the bundled-artifact load and the protocol resolution, so a refused request does no work and does not reveal whether a document is bundled; an anonymous caller gets the REST seam\'s flat 401 UNAUTHENTICATED, a signed-in caller is served as before, and a session held by the ADR-0069 auth-policy gate gets that gate\'s 403',
+    proof: 'showcase-anonymous-deny-surfaces.dogfood.test.ts',
+    // The REST family at ledger granularity. The family is exactly these two
+    // routes and both handlers open with the floor, which is the property a
+    // family key needs.
+    covers: ['rest-family:rest-route-ledger.ts:openapi'],
+    note: 'Measured on a booted showcase before the change: an unauthenticated caller was served the document and the viewer page with 200, just as a signed-in caller was, while the record doors on the same boot answered it 401 — ADR-0056 D2 is default-deny and no ADR-0138 D2 door class names these endpoints. The cited proof drives both endpoints anonymously (401, the REST flat envelope, nothing of either served) and with a signed-in member (200, the document / the viewer page) on one boot. The environment-scoped twin mounts only under project scoping, which the showcase does not enable; it is the same handler closure, pinned per base in rest/src/rest-api-description-anonymous-deny.test.ts beside the gated-session 403 and the permission-store-outage 503. The viewer page fetches the document from the browser, and that request carries the browser\'s session (measured with the real viewer in a browser), so a signed-in browser is served on both endpoints; a deployment that publishes its API description to readers without an account publishes a static copy of the document instead.' },
 
   // ── #2992 / ADR-0096 D4 — latent execution surfaces (pre-wiring identity
   // admission). Neither surface is reachable by a client today; these rows
 
@@ -977,6 +977,8 @@ describe('the ledger-sourced population and its baseline bite', () => {
       'dispatcher-domain:route-ledger.ts:/meta',
       'dispatcher-domain:route-ledger.ts:/packages',
       'rest-family:rest-route-ledger.ts:metadata',
+      // [#22430] classified by `anonymous-deny-api-description`.
+      'rest-family:rest-route-ledger.ts:openapi',
     ]);
     // …and the two halves partition the population exactly: nothing minted by
     // a ledger probe is both, and nothing is neither.
 
@@ -70,7 +70,9 @@
 export const LEDGER_POPULATION_BASELINE: readonly string[] = [
   // ── REST families (`packages/rest/src/rest-route-ledger.ts`) ────────────
   // `metadata` is absent because it IS classified — `anonymous-deny-meta`
-  // covers it through the guarded registrar. The other 18 families are here.
+  // covers it through the guarded registrar — and so is `openapi`, classified
+  // by `anonymous-deny-api-description` since #22430. The other 16 families
+  // are here.
   'rest-family:rest-route-ledger.ts:analytics',
   'rest-family:rest-route-ledger.ts:approvals',
   'rest-family:rest-route-ledger.ts:batch',
@@ -80,7 +82,6 @@ export const LEDGER_POPULATION_BASELINE: readonly string[] = [
   'rest-family:rest-route-ledger.ts:email',
   'rest-family:rest-route-ledger.ts:external-datasource',
   'rest-family:rest-route-ledger.ts:forms',
-  'rest-family:rest-route-ledger.ts:openapi',
   // ⚠️ NOT the same surface as `dispatcher-domain:route-ledger.ts:/packages`,
   // which IS classified: that key names the dispatcher domain whose single
   // handler body carries the domain-wide gate. This one names the four routes
@@ -126,6 +127,8 @@ export const LEDGER_POPULATION_BASELINE: readonly string[] = [
  * 2026-09-25 (#20102): `rest-family:rest-route-ledger.ts:reports` left with the
  * retired saved-report family — deleted, not classified. 32 at 2026-10-01
  * (#21061): `dispatcher-domain:route-ledger.ts:/analytics` left classified, by
- * the `anonymous-deny-analytics` row and its domain gate pin.
+ * the `anonymous-deny-analytics` row and its domain gate pin. 31 at 2026-10-09
+ * (#22430): `rest-family:rest-route-ledger.ts:openapi` left classified, by the
+ * `anonymous-deny-api-description` row and its booted-showcase proof.
  */
-export const LEDGER_POPULATION_BASELINE_MAX = 32;
+export const LEDGER_POPULATION_BASELINE_MAX = 31;
@@ -287,7 +287,10 @@ export interface ProbeTableReading {
 // table as a GATE_PIN on `packages/runtime/src/domains/analytics.ts`, and the
 // `anonymous-deny-analytics` row covers its key plus the `/analytics`
 // dispatcher-domain key that left the shrink-only ledger baseline.
-export const PROBE_TABLE: ProbeTableReading = { entries: 19, files: 14, keys: 17 };
+// [#22430] 19 / 14 / 17 -> 19 / 14 / 18: no probe and no file joined; the
+// `anonymous-deny-api-description` row covers one more key, the `openapi` REST
+// family, which left the shrink-only ledger baseline.
+export const PROBE_TABLE: ProbeTableReading = { entries: 19, files: 14, keys: 18 };
 
 /**
  * The probe count `authz-conformance.matrix.ts`'s header states.
@@ -342,13 +345,15 @@ export const PROBE_FILE_CENSUS: readonly ProbeFileReading[] = [
     blindSpot: 0,
     populationRule: 'ledger rows inside REST_ROUTE_LEDGER; reachable = rows carrying a `family` (each distinct value mints a key)',
     controls: { "route: '": 82, "family: '": 82, RestRouteLedgerEntry: 2 },
+    // [#22430] The `openapi` family is the second classified one, by the
+    // `anonymous-deny-api-description` row; the note's 2 / 16 counts it.
     note:
       'The audited disposition of every route @objectstack/rest mounts, enumerated through ' +
       'RestServer.getRoutes() on a booted server and guarded per route by rest-route-ledger.conformance.test.ts. ' +
       'That guard is why this file can be a population source and a regex table cannot: a mounted route with no ' +
       'row here is already RED in another package, so a new family cannot be silently absent from this file, ' +
-      'and therefore cannot be silently absent from the authz ratchet either. 18 families; 1 classified by a ' +
-      'matrix row (metadata), 17 enumerated in the shrink-only baseline. Re-measured 83 -> 82 when the anonymous ' +
+      'and therefore cannot be silently absent from the authz ratchet either. 18 families; 2 classified by ' +
+      'matrix rows (metadata and openapi), 16 enumerated in the shrink-only baseline. Re-measured 83 -> 82 when the anonymous ' +
       'public-form lookup-picker row left with its route; it carried `family: forms`, which the surviving form rows ' +
       'still carry, so `reachable` moved with `population` and the families stay 18. Earlier re-measured 91 -> 83 (19 -> 18 families) ' +
       'when the whole saved-report `reports` family left with its eight routes, all eight carrying the family, so ' +
@@ -499,6 +504,13 @@ export const PROBE_FILE_CENSUS: readonly ProbeFileReading[] = [
     // not move: the handler never called `enforceAuth` (the public-form routes
     // bypass it), so that stays 56, and `registerFormEndpoints` survives, so
     // `private register*Endpoints(` stays 16.
+    // [#22430] `enforceAuth` 56 -> 58, and nothing else on this row moved:
+    // 71 / 19 / 52 and every other control re-derived unchanged. The two
+    // API-description handlers in `registerOpenApiEndpoints` (the document and
+    // its viewer) now open with `if (this.enforceAuth(req, res, context))
+    // return;` — two call sites, no prose mention. Both routes were already in
+    // the population and stay outside `registerMetadataEndpoints`, so the blind
+    // spot is unchanged: guarding a route is not reaching it with a key.
     controls: {
       'private register*Endpoints(': 16,
       'this.routeManager.register(': 64,
@@ -509,7 +521,7 @@ export const PROBE_FILE_CENSUS: readonly ProbeFileReading[] = [
       'registerPerItemRoute(': 8,
       'const registerPerItemRoute =': 1,
       'forwarder slice: this.routeManager.register(': 1,
-      enforceAuth: 56,
+      enforceAuth: 58,
     },
     note:
       'The single non-tripwire probe names ONE registrar of 16. The other 15 can never mint a key: ' +
 
@@ -43,19 +43,20 @@ describe('authz probe blind-spot census (#13260)', () => {
     expect(derived.table).toEqual(PROBE_TABLE);
   });
 
-  it('every classified key is accounted for — 17 `covers` keys, no more', () => {
-    // The matrix's `covers` keys number 17 today: the 9 probe-minted keys this
+  it('every classified key is accounted for — 18 `covers` keys, no more', () => {
+    // The matrix's `covers` keys number 18 today: the 9 probe-minted keys this
     // census was first measured against, plus the 6 ledger family/domain keys
     // classified when the population moved (2026-08-31), plus the `/analytics`
-    // domain's gate-pin key and its dispatcher-domain key (#21061). If a probe
+    // domain's gate-pin key and its dispatcher-domain key (#21061), plus the
+    // `openapi` REST family key (#22430). If a probe
     // starts minting a key no row covers, the ratchet itself goes red as
     // UNCLASSIFIED — that is its job, and this pin does not duplicate it. What
     // this asserts is only that the census's key count is current.
     //
-    // ⚠️ This is NOT the size of the population. The ledgers mint 39 keys; 7
-    // are classified here and 32 are enumerated in the shrink-only baseline,
+    // ⚠️ This is NOT the size of the population. The ledgers mint 39 keys; 8
+    // are classified here and 31 are enumerated in the shrink-only baseline,
     // which `authz-conformance.test.ts` holds to its own four rules.
-    expect(PROBE_TABLE.keys).toBe(17);
+    expect(PROBE_TABLE.keys).toBe(18);
   });
 
   it.each(PROBE_FILE_CENSUS.map((r) => [r.file, r] as const))(
 
@@ -50,6 +50,17 @@
 // authz-row: anonymous-deny-automation
 // authz-row: anonymous-deny-packages
 // authz-row: anonymous-deny-analytics
+// authz-row: anonymous-deny-api-description
+//
+// ── Why the API-description endpoints are here (#22430) ────────────────────
+//
+// `@objectstack/rest`'s `registerOpenApiEndpoints` mounts the API-description
+// endpoints — the document and its viewer page — and until #22430 neither
+// handler asked who was calling: on a stock boot both answered an
+// unauthenticated caller 200, exactly as they answered a signed-in one, while
+// the record doors beside them answered 401. Both are driven below anonymously
+// (401 in the REST flat envelope, nothing of either served) and with a
+// signed-in member as the 200 control, on this one boot.
 //
 // ── Why the analytics faces are here (#21061) ──────────────────────────────
 //
@@ -137,6 +148,21 @@ const ANALYTICS_FACES: readonly AnalyticsFace[] = [
   { face: 'the analytics meta face', method: 'GET', path: '/analytics/meta' },
 ];
 
+// ── #22430 — the API-description endpoints (@objectstack/rest) ──────────────
+//
+// Both register on every base the server mounts; this boot mounts only the
+// unscoped one (the showcase does not enable project scoping), and the
+// environment-scoped twin — the same handler closures — is pinned per base in
+// `packages/rest/src/rest-api-description-anonymous-deny.test.ts`.
+interface ApiDescriptionEndpoint {
+  readonly endpoint: string;
+  readonly path: string;
+}
+const API_DESCRIPTION_ENDPOINTS: readonly ApiDescriptionEndpoint[] = [
+  { endpoint: 'the API-description document', path: '/openapi.json' },
+  { endpoint: 'the API-description viewer', path: '/docs' },
+];
+
 // ── #11373 — the /meta WRITE doors, driven through the REAL mount ──────────
 //
 // The `/meta` cases above this line were, for this file's whole life, ONE
@@ -636,6 +662,40 @@ describe('showcase: anonymous posture is uniform across surfaces (#2567)', () =>
     },
   );
 
+  // ── the API-description endpoints (@objectstack/rest) — #22430 ──────────
+  //
+  // The refusal is the handler's first act, so the anonymous body is the REST
+  // seam's shared one, whole, and carries nothing of the document or the page.
+  // The member control is the teeth: the same endpoint, with a session, is
+  // served 200 on this boot, so the 401 is the floor's answer and the endpoint
+  // is really mounted here.
+  it.each(API_DESCRIPTION_ENDPOINTS)('an anonymous caller on $endpoint is denied (401) and served nothing', async (ep) => {
+    const r = await anon('GET', ep.path);
+    expect(r.status, `${ep.endpoint}: an anonymous caller must be refused by the floor`).toBe(ANONYMOUS_DENY_STATUS);
+    expect(r.headers.get('content-type') ?? '', `${ep.endpoint}: the refusal is JSON, never the page`).toContain('application/json');
+    const body = await r.json();
+    expect(body, `${ep.endpoint}: the refusal is the REST seam's shared body, whole`).toEqual(ANONYMOUS_DENY_BODY);
+    expect(body, `${ep.endpoint}: nothing of the document rides on the refusal`).not.toHaveProperty('openapi');
+    expect(body, `${ep.endpoint}: nothing of the document rides on the refusal`).not.toHaveProperty('paths');
+  });
+
+  it('a signed-in member is served the API-description document (200) — the control', async () => {
+    const r = await stack.apiAs(memberToken, 'GET', '/openapi.json');
+    expect(r.status, 'an authenticated member must clear the floor and be served the document').toBe(200);
+    const body = await r.json();
+    expect(body.openapi, 'the served body is the OpenAPI 3.1 document').toBe('3.1.0');
+    expect(Object.keys(body.paths ?? {}).length, 'the document describes the mounted surface').toBeGreaterThan(0);
+  });
+
+  it('a signed-in member is served the API-description viewer page (200) — the control', async () => {
+    const r = await stack.apiAs(memberToken, 'GET', '/docs');
+    expect(r.status, 'an authenticated member must clear the floor and be served the viewer').toBe(200);
+    expect(r.headers.get('content-type') ?? '', 'the viewer is an HTML page').toContain('text/html');
+    // The page loads its sibling document on the same base — the request that,
+    // from a signed-in browser, carries that browser's session.
+    expect(await r.text(), 'the viewer points at its sibling document').toContain('data-url="/api/v1/openapi.json"');
+  });
+
   // ── one code, one message — two wrappers ───────────────────────────────
   it('every denied surface answers the SAME code and message (the wrappers differ)', async () => {
     const rest = await Promise.all([
@@ -740,6 +800,13 @@ describe('showcase: anonymous posture is uniform across surfaces (#2567)', () =>
     // [#21060] The two remaining REST families the checklist item names.
     { seam: 'POST /batch', owner: '@objectstack/rest enforceAuth', family: 'rest-flat', call: () => anon('POST', BATCH, BATCH_PROBE_BODY) },
     { seam: 'GET /security/explain', owner: '@objectstack/rest enforceAuth', family: 'rest-flat', call: () => anon('GET', EXPLAIN) },
+    // [#22430] The API-description endpoints, labelled by endpoint.
+    ...API_DESCRIPTION_ENDPOINTS.map((ep) => ({
+      seam: ep.endpoint,
+      owner: '@objectstack/rest registerOpenApiEndpoints (enforceAuth)',
+      family: 'rest-flat' as DenyFamily,
+      call: () => anon('GET', ep.path),
+    })),
     { seam: 'POST /actions/:object/:action/:id', owner: 'runtime domains/actions.ts', family: 'dispatcher-wrapper', call: () => anon('POST', ACTION, { params: {} }) },
     { seam: 'POST /automation/:name/trigger', owner: 'runtime domains/automation.ts', family: 'dispatcher-wrapper', call: () => anon('POST', `/automation/${FLOW}/trigger`, {}) },
     { seam: 'GET /automation/_status', owner: 'runtime domains/automation.ts', family: 'dispatcher-wrapper', call: () => anon('GET', '/automation/_status') },