@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+---
+'@objectstack/plugin-auth': patch
+---
+
+fix(plugin-auth): SSO domain verification accepts the DNS TXT record that request-domain-verification tells the operator to publish (#25111)
+
+Clause-②: no — the verify door now accepts the record the platform already names, as `@better-auth/sso` designed it; the one record it stops accepting is `undefined=TOKEN`, which only the defect produced and nothing instructs.
+Metadata-protocol: none
+
+`POST /api/v1/auth/admin/sso/request-domain-verification` tells the operator to publish a TXT record named `_better-auth-token-PROVIDER.DOMAIN` with the value `_better-auth-token-PROVIDER=TOKEN`. `POST /api/v1/auth/admin/sso/verify-domain` (and the vendor route behind it, `POST /api/v1/auth/sso/verify-domain`) refused exactly that record with `502 DOMAIN_VERIFICATION_FAILED`. The vendor builds the record it accepts from the verification row's `identifier`, and the storage adapter handed it that row without the column (`sys_verification.identifier` is `internal`), so it expected `undefined=TOKEN`.
+
+- **Now.** The adapter hands better-auth the row's `identifier` the same way it already hands back `value`. The instructed record verifies on both doors and marks the provider verified.
+- **Still refused.** A wrong token, the token under another provider's label, the record published under another provider's name, and `undefined=TOKEN`: each answers `502 DOMAIN_VERIFICATION_FAILED` and leaves the provider unverified.
+- **Unchanged.** A record holding only the token is still accepted, as the vendor designed it. The generic data API still omits `identifier` from every `sys_verification` row.
@@ -184,6 +184,44 @@ describe('[#24061] a column the read was keyed on is answered from the lookup',
   });
 });
 
+describe('[#25111] sys_verification.identifier — @better-auth/sso verify-domain reads it off the row', () => {
+  // `findVerificationValue(identifier)` is `findMany(verification, where
+  // identifier = …)`; the vendor then builds the TXT record it accepts as
+  // `${row.identifier}=${row.value}`. The real-handler pin is
+  // `sso-domain-verification-instructed-record.test.ts`; this pins the seam.
+  const byIdentifier = (value: string) => [
+    { field: 'identifier', value, operator: 'eq', connector: 'AND', mode: 'sensitive' },
+  ];
+
+  it('a stripped row (the findMany shape, no lookup) gets BOTH columns back — one batched call per column', async () => {
+    const resolveInternalField = resolver({ v1: { value: 'TOKEN', identifier: '_better-auth-token-acme' } });
+    const rows: any[] = [{ id: 'v1', expires_at: '2099-01-01' }];
+    await reattachInternalFieldsOnRead({ resolveInternalField }, 'sys_verification', rows);
+    expect(rows[0].value).toBe('TOKEN');
+    expect(rows[0].identifier).toBe('_better-auth-token-acme');
+    expect(resolveInternalField).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+    expect(resolveInternalField).toHaveBeenCalledWith('sys_verification', ['v1'], 'identifier');
+  });
+
+  it('a read keyed on identifier answers it from the lookup — only `value` costs a privileged read', async () => {
+    const resolveInternalField = resolver({ v1: { value: 'TOKEN', identifier: 'never-read' } });
+    const row: any = { id: 'v1' };
+    await reattachInternalFieldsOnRead(
+      { resolveInternalField }, 'sys_verification', row, undefined, byIdentifier('_better-auth-token-acme'),
+    );
+    expect(row.identifier).toBe('_better-auth-token-acme');
+    expect(row.value).toBe('TOKEN');
+    expect(resolveInternalField).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(resolveInternalField).toHaveBeenCalledWith('sys_verification', ['v1'], 'value');
+  });
+
+  it('fails closed on a row the strip emptied of identifier when the engine offers no accessor', async () => {
+    // `required: true`, so absence can only be the strip — the `value` posture.
+    const row: any = { id: 'v1', value: 'TOKEN' };
+    await expect(reattachInternalFieldsOnRead({}, 'sys_verification', row)).rejects.toThrow(/'identifier'/);
+  });
+});
+
 describe('#7987 reattachInternalFieldsOnRead — sys_account OAuth columns', () => {
   const ACCOUNT_ROW = () => ({ id: 'a1', user_id: 'u1', provider_id: 'google' });
 
 
@@ -195,7 +195,8 @@ const READBACK_FIELDS: Readonly<Record<string, readonly ReadbackColumn[]>> = {
   // mirror that honours the same flag — carries it, and each is here because a
   // better-auth route reads it back OFF a row its storage adapter returned
   // (traced in the then-installed better-auth / @better-auth/* dist, 1.7.3;
-  // ⚠️ [#25096] NOT re-stamped for 1.7.12 — see the `identifier` note below):
+  // ⚠️ [#25096] NOT re-stamped for 1.7.12 as a whole — only the
+  // `sys_verification` row below was re-traced there, by #25111):
   //
   //  - `sys_jwks.private_key` — the jwt plugin's key read (`findMany`, no
   //    projection) feeds signing. MEASURED before this row existed: the flag
@@ -205,13 +206,24 @@ const READBACK_FIELDS: Readonly<Record<string, readonly ReadbackColumn[]>> = {
   //  - `sys_verification.value` — reset-password, email/phone OTP, magic link
   //    and OIDC code redemption read it off the found or CONSUMED row (the
   //    adapter's `consumeOne` re-attaches through this table too).
-  //    `required: true`. `identifier` is deliberately absent: no flow reads it
-  //    back off a row — it is only ever the lookup key.
-  //    ⚠️ [#25096] That census is wrong, on 1.7.3 and on 1.7.12 alike:
-  //    `@better-auth/sso`'s `/sso/verify-domain` builds the TXT record it
-  //    expects from `identifier` read back off the row, so on this store it
-  //    expects `undefined=TOKEN`. Measured and reported on #25096; nothing
-  //    here is changed by that card.
+  //    `required: true`.
+  //  - `sys_verification.identifier` [#25111] — `@better-auth/sso`'s
+  //    `/sso/verify-domain` (traced on 1.7.12, the same code on 1.7.3) builds
+  //    the TXT record it accepts as `${activeVerification.identifier}=${value}`
+  //    from the row `findVerificationValue` read back, beside the bare value.
+  //    Stripped, that row made it expect `undefined=TOKEN`: the record
+  //    `request-domain-verification` tells the operator to publish
+  //    (`_better-auth-token-PROVIDER=TOKEN`, `register-sso-provider.ts`)
+  //    answered 502 DOMAIN_VERIFICATION_FAILED, and a record spelling
+  //    `undefined=TOKEN` verified. It is the ONLY reader of the column off a
+  //    row in better-auth, @better-auth/sso, /oauth-provider and /scim 1.7.12;
+  //    every other flow uses it as the lookup key alone. It hands the vendor
+  //    nothing it does not already hold: every verification read better-auth
+  //    issues is keyed on `identifier` (`findVerificationValue`,
+  //    `consumeVerificationValue`), a `findOne` keyed on it is answered from
+  //    the lookup with no privileged read (#24061), and no vendor route echoes
+  //    a verification row to its caller. The generic exits still strip it.
+  //    `required: true` ⇒ absence can only be the strip.
   //  - `sys_two_factor.secret` (`required: true`) and `.backup_codes` (empty
   //    until generated) — TOTP and backup-code verification read both off the
   //    enrolment row.
@@ -222,7 +234,10 @@ const READBACK_FIELDS: Readonly<Record<string, readonly ReadbackColumn[]>> = {
   //    digest off the client row to verify a presented secret; empty on a
   //    public client.
   [SystemObjectName.JWKS]: [{ field: 'private_key', absenceProvesStrip: true }],
-  [SystemObjectName.VERIFICATION]: [{ field: 'value', absenceProvesStrip: true }],
+  [SystemObjectName.VERIFICATION]: [
+    { field: 'value', absenceProvesStrip: true },
+    { field: 'identifier', absenceProvesStrip: true },
+  ],
   [SystemObjectName.TWO_FACTOR]: [
     { field: 'secret', absenceProvesStrip: true },
     { field: 'backup_codes', absenceProvesStrip: false },
@@ -252,7 +267,8 @@ const FAIL_CLOSED_CONSEQUENCE: Readonly<Record<string, string>> = {
     + '(no set-auth-jwt header, no OIDC id_token)',
   [SystemObjectName.VERIFICATION]:
     'better-auth one-time verification flows (password reset, OTP, magic link, OIDC code redemption) '
-    + 'would find no stored value on such rows and refuse every outstanding code',
+    + 'would find no stored value on such rows and refuse every outstanding code, and SSO domain '
+    + 'verification would refuse the DNS record request-domain-verification names',
   [SystemObjectName.TWO_FACTOR]:
     'better-auth two-factor verification would find no TOTP secret on such rows and refuse every code',
 };