reported via email on 27 May 2026 - no response:
I would like to report a security issue in the openvscode-server fork of VS Code.
In src/vs/platform/extensionManagement/node/extensionManagementService.ts, the class ExtensionManagementService contains a method not present in upstream microsoft/vscode:
private disableSignatureVerification() {
return true;
}
This method is called during every gallery (marketplace) extension download at line 349, forcing verifySignature = false unconditionally. The result is that openvscode-server never performs cryptographic signature validation on gallery extensions, regardless of user settings or the VerifyExtensionSignatureConfigKey configuration. Upstream VS Code Server would reject unsigned or tampered extensions with a SignatureVerificationFailed error.
This affects all tagged releases through v1.109.5 (the latest as of this report) and the current HEAD (commit 2bfb814).
The practical risk is:
- Any tampered gallery extension that upstream VS Code would detect and block installs silently.
- Any unsigned or typosquatted extension that upstream VS Code would reject with a signing error installs without warning.
- Enterprise and cloud deployments that rely on extension signing as a supply-chain integrity control have that control silently removed.
I would suggest restoring the upstream behavior by removing disableSignatureVerification() and the block that calls it, allowing the standard VerifyExtensionSignatureConfigKey configuration path to govern verification as it does in microsoft/vscode.
reported via email on 27 May 2026 - no response:
I would like to report a security issue in the openvscode-server fork of VS Code.
In
src/vs/platform/extensionManagement/node/extensionManagementService.ts, the classExtensionManagementServicecontains a method not present in upstream microsoft/vscode:This method is called during every gallery (marketplace) extension download at line 349, forcing
verifySignature = falseunconditionally. The result is that openvscode-server never performs cryptographic signature validation on gallery extensions, regardless of user settings or theVerifyExtensionSignatureConfigKeyconfiguration. Upstream VS Code Server would reject unsigned or tampered extensions with aSignatureVerificationFailederror.This affects all tagged releases through v1.109.5 (the latest as of this report) and the current HEAD (commit 2bfb814).
The practical risk is:
I would suggest restoring the upstream behavior by removing
disableSignatureVerification()and the block that calls it, allowing the standardVerifyExtensionSignatureConfigKeyconfiguration path to govern verification as it does in microsoft/vscode.