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{
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"schema_version": "1.4.0",
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"id": "GHSA-38hg-ww64-rrwc",
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"modified": "2026-04-04T06:13:57Z",
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"published": "2026-04-04T06:13:57Z",
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"aliases": [
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"CVE-2026-35442"
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],
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"summary": "Directus: Authenticated Users Can Extract Concealed Fields via Aggregate Queries",
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"details": "### Summary\n\nAggregate functions (`min`, `max`) applied to fields with the `conceal` special type incorrectly return raw database values instead of the masked placeholder. When combined with `groupBy`, any authenticated user with read access to the affected collection can extract concealed field values, including static API tokens and two-factor authentication secrets from `directus_users`.\n\n### Details\n\nFields marked with `conceal` are protected by payload processing logic that replaces real values with a masked placeholder on read. This protection works correctly for standard item queries, but aggregate query results are structured differently, operations are nested under their function name rather than appearing as flat field keys. The masking logic does not account for this nested structure, causing it to silently skip concealed fields in aggregate responses and return their raw values to the client.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Account Takeover** An authenticated attacker can harvest static API tokens for all users, including administrators, enabling immediate authentication as any account without credentials.\n\n- **2FA Bypass** TOTP seeds stored in directus_users can similarly be extracted, allowing an attacker to bypass two-factor authentication for any account.",
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"severity": [
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{
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"type": "CVSS_V3",
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"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"
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}
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],
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"affected": [
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "npm",
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"name": "directus"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "0"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "11.17.0"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/directus/directus/security/advisories/GHSA-38hg-ww64-rrwc"
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},
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{
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"type": "PACKAGE",
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"url": "https://github.com/directus/directus"
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"cwe_ids": [
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"CWE-200",
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"CWE-863"
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],
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"severity": "HIGH",
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"github_reviewed": true,
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"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-04T06:13:57Z",
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"nvd_published_at": null
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}
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}
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{
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"schema_version": "1.4.0",
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"id": "GHSA-6q22-g298-grjh",
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"modified": "2026-04-04T06:13:25Z",
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"published": "2026-04-04T06:13:25Z",
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"aliases": [],
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"summary": "Directus: Unauthenticated Denial of Service via GraphQL Alias Amplification of Expensive Health Check Resolver",
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"details": "## Summary\n\nThe GraphQL specification permits a single query to repeat the same field multiple times using aliases, with each alias resolved independently by default. Directus did not deduplicate resolver invocations within a single request, meaning each alias triggered a full, independent execution of the underlying resolver.\n\nThe health check resolver ran all backend checks (database connectivity, cache, storage writes, and SMTP verification) on every invocation. Combined with unauthenticated access to the system GraphQL endpoint, this allowed an attacker to amplify resource consumption significantly from a single HTTP request, exhausting the database connection pool, storage I/O, and SMTP connections.\n\n## Fix\n\nA request-scoped resolver deduplication mechanism was introduced and applied broadly across all GraphQL read resolvers, both system and items endpoints. When multiple aliases in a single request invoke the same resolver with identical arguments, only the first call executes; all subsequent aliases share its result. This eliminates the amplification factor regardless of how many aliases an attacker includes in a query.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Service degradation or outage:** Database connection pool exhaustion prevents all Directus operations for all users\n- **Storage I/O saturation:** Concurrent file writes can overwhelm disk I/O\n- **SMTP resource exhaustion:** Concurrent SMTP verification calls may overwhelm the mail server\n- **No authentication required:** Any network-accessible attacker can trigger this condition\n- **Single-request impact:** A single request is sufficient to cause significant resource consumption\n\n## Credit\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered and reported by [bugbunny.ai](https://bugbunny.ai).",
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"severity": [
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{
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"type": "CVSS_V3",
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"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H"
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}
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],
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"affected": [
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "npm",
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"name": "directus"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "0"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "11.17.0"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/directus/directus/security/advisories/GHSA-6q22-g298-grjh"
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},
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{
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"type": "PACKAGE",
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"url": "https://github.com/directus/directus"
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"cwe_ids": [
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"CWE-400",
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"CWE-770"
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],
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"severity": "HIGH",
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"github_reviewed": true,
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"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-04T06:13:25Z",
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"nvd_published_at": null
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}
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}
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{
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"schema_version": "1.4.0",
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"id": "GHSA-mcww-4hxq-hfr3",
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"modified": "2026-04-04T06:14:41Z",
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"published": "2026-04-04T06:14:41Z",
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"aliases": [
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"CVE-2026-30762"
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],
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"summary": "LightRAG: Hardcoded JWT Signing Secret Allows Authentication Bypass",
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"details": "Summary:\nThe file lightrag/api/config.py (line 397) uses a default JWT secret \"lightrag-jwt-default-secret\" when the TOKEN_SECRET environment variable is not set. The AuthHandler in lightrag/api/auth.py (lines 24-25) uses this secret to sign and verify tokens. An unauthenticated attacker can forge valid JWT tokens using the publicly known default secret and gain access to any protected endpoint.\n\nReproduction:\n1. Install LightRAG v1.4.10 with AUTH_ACCOUNTS configured but no TOKEN_SECRET set\n2. Use PyJWT to sign a token: jwt.encode({\"sub\": \"admin\", \"role\": \"user\"}, \"lightrag-jwt-default-secret\", algorithm=\"HS256\")\n3. Send a request to any protected endpoint with the header: Authorization: Bearer <forged_token>\n4. Access is granted without valid credentials\n\nSuggested Fix:\nRequire TOKEN_SECRET to be explicitly set when AUTH_ACCOUNTS is configured. Refuse to start the API server if authentication is enabled but no custom secret is provided.\n\n---\nVenkata Avinash Taduturi\ntaduturivenkata@gmail.com",
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"severity": [
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{
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"type": "CVSS_V3",
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"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N"
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}
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],
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"affected": [
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "PyPI",
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"name": "lightrag-hku"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "0"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "1.4.13"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 1.4.12"
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}
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}
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/HKUDS/LightRAG/security/advisories/GHSA-mcww-4hxq-hfr3"
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},
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{
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"type": "PACKAGE",
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"url": "https://github.com/HKUDS/LightRAG"
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"cwe_ids": [
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"CWE-287"
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],
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"severity": "HIGH",
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"github_reviewed": true,
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"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-04T06:14:41Z",
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"nvd_published_at": null
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}
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}

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