+ "details": "### Impact\nTiming side-channel vulnerability in verify_key(). The method applied a random delay only on verification failures, allowing an attacker to statistically distinguish valid from invalid API keys by measuring response latencies. With enough repeated requests, an adversary could infer whether a key_id corresponds to a valid key, potentially accelerating brute-force or enumeration attacks.\n\nAffected: all users relying on verify_key() for API key authentication prior to the fix.\n\n### Patches\nYes. Users should upgrade to version 1.1.0 (or the version containing this fix). The patch applies a uniform random delay (min_delay to max_delay) to all responses regardless of outcome, eliminating the timing correlation.\n\n### Workarounds\n- Add an application-level fixed delay or random jitter to all authentication responses (success and failure) before the fix is applied.\n- Use rate limiting to reduce the feasibility of statistical timing attacks.\n\n### References\n- CWE-208: Observable Timing Discrepancy\n- Commit: 87b27640f77c5ef86c46311b6b5a7e2887e35b77\n- OWASP: https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Timing_attack",
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