+ "details": "## Summary\n\nMustache navigation templates interpolated configuration-controlled link values\ndirectly into `href` attributes without URL scheme validation. An administrator\nwho could modify the `navItems` configuration could inject `javascript:` URIs,\nenabling stored cross-site scripting (XSS) against other authenticated users\nviewing the Emissary web interface.\n\n## Details\n\n### Vulnerable code — `nav.mustache` (line 10)\n\n```html\n{{#navItems}}\n<li class=\"nav-item\">\n <a class=\"nav-link\" href=\"{{link}}\">{{display}}</a>\n</li>\n{{/navItems}}\n```\n\nThe `{{link}}` value was rendered without any scheme validation. Mustache's\ndefault HTML escaping protects against injection of new HTML tags but does\n**not** prevent `javascript:` URIs in `href` attributes, since `javascript:`\ncontains no characters that HTML-escaping would alter.\n\n### Attack vector\n\nAn administrator sets a navigation item's link to:\n```\njavascript:alert(document.cookie)\n```\n\nAny authenticated user who clicks the navigation link executes the script in\ntheir browser context.\n\n### Impact\n\n- Session hijacking via cookie theft\n- Actions performed on behalf of the victim user\n- Requires administrative access to modify navigation configuration\n- Requires user interaction (clicking the malicious link)\n\n### Mitigating factors\n\n- Exploitation requires administrative access to modify the `navItems`\n configuration\n- User interaction (clicking the link) is required\n- The Emissary web interface is typically accessed only by authenticated\n operators within a trusted network\n\n## Remediation\n\nFixed in [PR #1293](https://github.com/NationalSecurityAgency/emissary/pull/1293),\nmerged into release 8.39.0.\n\n### Server-side link validation — `NavAction.java`\n\nAn allowlist regex was added that only permits `http://`, `https://`, or\nsite-relative (`/`) URLs:\n\n```java\nprivate static final Pattern VALID_LINK = Pattern.compile(\"^(https?:/)?/.*\");\n\nprivate static boolean isValidLink(String link) {\n if (!VALID_LINK.matcher(link).matches()) {\n logger.warn(\"Skipping invalid navigation link '{}'\", link);\n return false;\n }\n return true;\n}\n```\n\nInvalid links are logged and silently dropped from the rendered navigation.\n\n### Template hardening — `nav.mustache`\n\nAdded `rel=\"noopener noreferrer\"` to all navigation link anchor tags as a\ndefense-in-depth measure:\n\n```html\n<a class=\"nav-link\" href=\"{{link}}\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">{{display}}</a>\n```\n\nTests were added to verify that `javascript:` and `ftp://` URIs are rejected\nwhile `http://`, `https://`, and site-relative (`/path`) links are accepted.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, audit the navigation configuration\nto ensure all `navItems` link values use only `http://`, `https://`, or\nrelative (`/`) URL schemes.\n\n## References\n\n- [PR #1293 — validate nav links](https://github.com/NationalSecurityAgency/emissary/pull/1293)\n- Original report: GHSA-wjqm-p579-x3ww",
0 commit comments