+ "details": "## Summary\n\nPostiz has multiple SSRF vulnerabilities where user-provided URLs are fetched server-side without any IP validation or SSRF protection.\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\n### 1. Webhook Send Endpoint (Most Critical)\n\n**`apps/backend/src/api/routes/webhooks.controller.ts` lines 58-70:**\n```typescript\nasync sendWebhook(@Body() body: any, @Query('url') url: string) {\n try {\n await fetch(url, { // No URL validation\n method: 'POST',\n body: JSON.stringify(body),\n headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n });\n } catch (err) { }\n return { send: true };\n}\n```\n\nAccepts arbitrary URL via query parameter and fetches directly.\n\n### 2. Stored Webhook Delivery\n\n**`apps/orchestrator/src/activities/post.activity.ts` lines 256-281:**\n```typescript\nasync sendWebhooks(postId: string, orgId: string, integrationId: string) {\n const webhooks = await this._webhookService.getWebhooks(orgId);\n return Promise.all(\n webhooks.map(async (webhook) => {\n await fetch(webhook.url, { // Stored URL, no validation\n method: 'POST',\n body: JSON.stringify(post),\n });\n })\n );\n}\n```\n\n### 3. RSS/XML Feed Parser\n\n**`libraries/nestjs-libraries/src/database/prisma/autopost/autopost.service.ts` line 135:**\n```typescript\nasync loadXML(url: string) {\n const { items } = await parser.parseURL(url); // No URL validation\n}\n```\n\n### 4. HTML Content Loader\n\n**`libraries/nestjs-libraries/src/database/prisma/autopost/autopost.service.ts` line 185:**\n```typescript\nasync loadUrl(url: string) {\n const loadDom = new JSDOM(await (await fetch(url)).text()); // No validation\n}\n```\n\n## Missing Protections\n\n- No `request-filtering-agent` or SSRF library\n- No private IP range filtering\n- No cloud metadata endpoint blocking\n- No DNS rebinding protection\n- URL validation only via `@IsUrl()` decorator (format only, no IP check)\n\n## Attack Scenarios\n\n1. `POST /webhooks/send?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` → AWS metadata theft\n2. `POST /autopost/send?url=http://127.0.0.1:6379` → Internal Redis access\n3. Create webhook with `http://10.0.0.1:8080/admin` → Internal service access on post publish\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Cloud metadata theft**: AWS/GCP/Azure credentials\n- **Internal network scanning**: Full access to private IP ranges\n- **Multiple entry points**: Webhooks, RSS feeds, URL loader all vulnerable",
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