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{
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"schema_version": "1.4.0",
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"id": "GHSA-5rqw-r77c-jp79",
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"modified": "2026-04-03T02:46:16Z",
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"published": "2026-04-03T02:46:16Z",
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"aliases": [
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"CVE-2026-34779"
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],
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"summary": "Electron: AppleScript injection in app.moveToApplicationsFolder on macOS",
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"details": "### Impact\nOn macOS, `app.moveToApplicationsFolder()` used an AppleScript fallback path that did not properly handle certain characters in the application bundle path. Under specific conditions, a crafted launch path could lead to arbitrary AppleScript execution when the user accepted the move-to-Applications prompt.\n\nApps are only affected if they call `app.moveToApplicationsFolder()`. Apps that do not use this API are not affected.\n\n### Workarounds\nThere are no app side workarounds, developers must update to a patched version of Electron.\n\n### Fixed Versions\n* `41.0.0-beta.8`\n* `40.8.0`\n* `39.8.1`\n* `38.8.6`\n\n### For more information\nIf there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please email [security@electronjs.org](mailto:security@electronjs.org)",
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"severity": [
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{
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"type": "CVSS_V3",
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"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L"
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}
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],
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"affected": [
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "npm",
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"name": "electron"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "0"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "38.8.6"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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},
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "npm",
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"name": "electron"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "39.0.0-alpha.1"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "39.8.1"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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},
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "npm",
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"name": "electron"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "40.0.0-alpha.1"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "40.8.0"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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},
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "npm",
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"name": "electron"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "41.0.0-alpha.1"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "41.0.0-beta.8"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/electron/electron/security/advisories/GHSA-5rqw-r77c-jp79"
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},
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{
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"type": "PACKAGE",
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"url": "https://github.com/electron/electron"
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"cwe_ids": [
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"CWE-78"
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],
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"severity": "MODERATE",
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"github_reviewed": true,
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"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-03T02:46:16Z",
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"nvd_published_at": null
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}
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}
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{
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"schema_version": "1.4.0",
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"id": "GHSA-jfqg-hf23-qpw2",
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"modified": "2026-04-03T02:46:56Z",
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"published": "2026-04-03T02:46:56Z",
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"aliases": [
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"CVE-2026-34780"
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],
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"summary": "Electron: Context Isolation bypass via contextBridge VideoFrame transfer",
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"details": "### Impact\nApps that pass `VideoFrame` objects (from the WebCodecs API) across the `contextBridge` are vulnerable to a context isolation bypass. An attacker who can execute JavaScript in the main world (for example, via XSS) can use a bridged `VideoFrame` to gain access to the isolated world, including any Node.js APIs exposed to the preload script.\n\nApps are only affected if a preload script returns, resolves, or passes a `VideoFrame` object to the main world via `contextBridge.exposeInMainWorld()`. Apps that do not bridge `VideoFrame` objects are not affected.\n\n### Workarounds\nDo not pass `VideoFrame` objects across `contextBridge`. If an app needs to transfer video frame data, serialize it to an `ArrayBuffer` or `ImageBitmap` before bridging.\n\n### Fixed Versions\n* `41.0.0-beta.8`\n* `40.7.0`\n* `39.8.0`\n\n### For more information\nIf there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please email [security@electronjs.org](mailto:security@electronjs.org)",
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"severity": [
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{
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"type": "CVSS_V3",
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"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"
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}
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],
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"affected": [
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "npm",
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"name": "electron"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "39.0.0-alpha.1"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "39.8.0"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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},
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "npm",
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"name": "electron"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "40.0.0-alpha.1"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "40.7.0"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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},
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "npm",
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"name": "electron"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "41.0.0-alpha.1"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "41.0.0-beta.8"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/electron/electron/security/advisories/GHSA-jfqg-hf23-qpw2"
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},
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{
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"type": "PACKAGE",
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"url": "https://github.com/electron/electron"
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"cwe_ids": [
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"CWE-1188",
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"CWE-668"
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],
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"severity": "HIGH",
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"github_reviewed": true,
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"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-03T02:46:56Z",
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"nvd_published_at": null
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}
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}
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{
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"schema_version": "1.4.0",
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"id": "GHSA-qcj9-wwgw-6gm8",
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"modified": "2026-04-03T02:47:57Z",
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"published": "2026-04-03T02:47:57Z",
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"aliases": [],
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"summary": "OpenClaw: Workspace `.env` can override the bundled plugin trust root",
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"details": "## Summary\nWorkspace `.env` can override the bundled plugin trust root\n\n## Current Maintainer Triage\n- Status: open\n- Normalized severity: high\n- Assessment: v2026.3.28 still lets workspace .env override OPENCLAW_BUNDLED_PLUGINS_DIR, but critical is too high because exploitation still depends on attacker-controlled workspace loading, not a universal remote break.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Latest published npm version: `2026.3.31`\n- Vulnerable version range: `<=2026.3.28`\n- Patched versions: `>= 2026.3.31`\n- First stable tag containing the fix: `v2026.3.31`\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n- `330a9f98cb29c79b1c16a2117e03d6276a0d6289` — 2026-03-31T19:25:12+09:00\n\nOpenClaw thanks @nexrin for reporting.",
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"severity": [
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{
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"type": "CVSS_V4",
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"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
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}
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],
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"affected": [
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "npm",
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"name": "openclaw"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "0"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "2026.3.31"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 2026.3.28"
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}
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}
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-qcj9-wwgw-6gm8"
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},
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/330a9f98cb29c79b1c16a2117e03d6276a0d6289"
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},
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{
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"type": "PACKAGE",
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"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
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},
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.3.31"
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"cwe_ids": [
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"CWE-15"
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],
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"severity": "HIGH",
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"github_reviewed": true,
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"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-03T02:47:57Z",
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"nvd_published_at": null
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}
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}

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