+ "details": "### Summary\n\n Two model implementation files hardcode `trust_remote_code=True` when loading sub-components, bypassing the user's explicit `--trust-remote-code=False` security opt-out. This enables remote code execution via malicious model\n repositories even when the user has explicitly disabled remote code trust.\n\n ### Details\n\n **Affected files (latest main branch):**\n\n 1. `vllm/model_executor/models/nemotron_vl.py:430`\n ```python\n vision_model = AutoModel.from_config(config.vision_config, trust_remote_code=True)\n```\n\n 2. vllm/model_executor/models/kimi_k25.py:177\n \n```python\n cached_get_image_processor(self.ctx.model_config.model, trust_remote_code=True)\n```\n\n Both pass a hardcoded trust_remote_code=True to HuggingFace API calls, overriding the user's global --trust-remote-code=False setting.\n\n Relation to prior CVEs:\n - CVE-2025-66448 fixed auto_map resolution in vllm/transformers_utils/config.py (config loading path)\n - CVE-2026-22807 fixed broader auto_map at startup\n - Both fixes are present in the current code. These hardcoded instances in model files survived both patches — different code paths.\n\n### Impact\n\n Remote code execution. An attacker can craft a malicious model repository that executes arbitrary Python code when loaded by vLLM, even when the user has explicitly set --trust-remote-code=False. This undermines the security guarantee\n that trust_remote_code=False is intended to provide.\n\n Remediation: Replace hardcoded trust_remote_code=True with self.config.model_config.trust_remote_code in both files. Raise a clear error if the model component requires remote code but the user hasn't opted in.",
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