"details": "### Summary\nWhen iMessage remote attachment fetching is enabled (`channels.imessage.remoteHost`), `stageSandboxMedia` accepted arbitrary absolute paths and used SCP to copy them into local staging.\n\nIf a non-attachment path reaches this flow, files outside expected iMessage attachment directories on the remote host can be staged.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw`\n- Affected: up to and including `2026.2.17` (latest npm version as of February 19, 2026)\n- Fixed: pending next release with remote attachment path validation\n\n### Impact\nConfidentiality impact. An attacker who can influence inbound attachment path metadata may disclose files readable by the OpenClaw process on the configured remote host.\n\n### Attack Preconditions\n1. iMessage attachments enabled (`channels.imessage.includeAttachments=true`), and\n2. remote attachment mode active (`channels.imessage.remoteHost` configured or auto-detected), and\n3. attacker can inject/tamper with attachment path metadata.\n\nGiven these preconditions, this advisory is assessed as **medium** severity.\n\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n- `1316e5740382926e45a42097b4bfe0aef7d63e8e`\n\n### Release Process Note\n`patched_versions` should be set to the next released npm version that includes remote attachment path validation, then the advisory can be published.\n\n### Mitigation\n- Upgrade to the first release that includes remote attachment path validation.\n- If remote attachments are not required, disable iMessage attachment ingestion.\n- Run OpenClaw under least privilege on the remote host.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @zpbrent for reporting.",
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