+ "details": "### Summary\n.ics serialization does not properly sanitize URI property values, enabling ICS injection through attacker-controlled input, adding arbitrary calendar lines to the output.\n\n### Details\n`Icalendar::Values::Uri` falls back to the raw input string when `URI.parse` fails and later serializes it with `value.to_s` without removing or escaping `\\r` or `\\n` characters. That value is embedded directly into the final ICS line by the normal serializer, so a payload containing CRLF can terminate the original property and create a new ICS property or component. (It looks like you can inject via url, source, image, organizer, attach, attendee, conference, tzurl because of this)\n\nRelevant code:\n- `lib/icalendar/values/uri.rb:16`\n\n### PoC\nRun the following with the library loaded:\n\n```ruby\nrequire \"icalendar/value\"\nrequire \"icalendar/values/uri\"\n\nv = Icalendar::Values::Uri.new(\"https://a.example/ok\\r\\nATTENDEE:mailto:evil@example.com\")\nputs v.to_ical(Icalendar::Values::Text)\n```\n\noutput:\n\n```text\n;VALUE=URI:https://a.example/ok\nATTENDEE:mailto:evil@example.com\n```\n\n### Impact\nApplications that generate `.ics` files from partially untrusted metadata are impacted. As a result, downstream calendar clients or importers may process attacker-supplied content as if it were legitimate event data, such as added attendees, modified URLs, alarms, or other calendar fields.\n\n## Fix\nReject raw CR and LF characters in `URI`-typed values before serialization, or escape/encode them so they cannot terminate the current ICS content line.",
0 commit comments