Skip to content

Commit 5a6872b

Browse files
advisory-database[bot]advisory-database[bot]
committed
Publish Advisories
GHSA-4vxv-4xq4-p84h GHSA-8fq3-c5w3-pj3q GHSA-fc4p-p49v-r948 GHSA-fhrf-q333-82fm GHSA-x7wh-g25g-53vg
1 parent 6b73dce commit 5a6872b

5 files changed

Lines changed: 304 additions & 0 deletions

File tree

‎advisories/github-reviewed/2026/04/GHSA-4vxv-4xq4-p84h/GHSA-4vxv-4xq4-p84h.json‎

Lines changed: 62 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
1+
{
2+
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
3+
"id": "GHSA-4vxv-4xq4-p84h",
4+
"modified": "2026-04-01T22:08:29Z",
5+
"published": "2026-04-01T22:08:29Z",
6+
"aliases": [
7+
"CVE-2026-34570"
8+
],
9+
"summary": "CI4MS: Account Deletion Module Grants Full Persistent Unauthorized Access for All‑Roles via Improper Session Invalidation (Logic Flaw)",
10+
"details": "## Summary\n### Vulnerability: Improper Session Invalidation on Account Deletion (Broken Access Control / Logic Flaw)\n- This vulnerability is caused by a backend logic flaw that maintains a false trust assumption that already-authenticated users remain trustworthy, even after their accounts are explicitly deleted. As a result, administrative security actions do not behave as intended, allowing persistent unauthorized access.\n\n### Description\nThe application fails to immediately revoke active user sessions when an account is **deleted**. Due to a logic flaw in the backend design, account state changes are enforced only during authentication (login), not for already-established sessions.\n\nThe system implicitly assumes that authenticated users remain trusted for the lifetime of their session. There is no session expiration or account expiration mechanism in place, causing deleted accounts to retain indefinite access until the user manually logs out. This behavior breaks the intended access control policy and results in persistent unauthorized access, representing a critical security flaw.\n\n### Affected Functionality\n- User session management and authentication logic\n- Account **deletion** mechanism\n- All authenticated endpoints, including administrative and content interfaces\n\n### Attack Scenario\n- A user logs into the application.\n- An administrator **deletes** the user account.\n- The user remains fully logged in and can continue performing all actions allowed by their role indefinitely, as there is no session expiration.\n- The user can continue invoking backend methods, triggering application actions, accessing sensitive interfaces (including user management if permitted), and interacting with the system as if the account were still active.\n- Access is only lost if the user manually logs out, which may never occur.\n\n### Impact\n- **Unauthorized Continued Access:** Deleted users retain full access indefinitely, violating intended access control and expected security behavior.\n- **Bypass of Administrative Controls:** Administrative actions (**deletion**) fail to immediately restrict active sessions.\n- **Logic Flaw Resulting in Broken Behavior:** Backend authorization logic relies on a flawed trust assumption that authenticated users remain valid, enforcing account state only at login.\n- **Full Functional Access Retained:** Deleted users can continue invoking application methods, executing actions, interacting with protected endpoints, and using the system exactly as before deletion.\n- **Privilege Abuse:** Users with elevated roles (moderator, editor, administrator) can continue performing privileged actions after account deletion, including accessing user management interfaces and modifying application state.\n- **Service Disruption Potential:** Persistent access allows attackers to disrupt services, manipulate content, or interfere with normal application operations.\n- **Attack Persistence:** Attackers can maintain access indefinitely, increasing the risk of data exfiltration, unauthorized modifications, or further privilege escalation.\n- **False Sense of Remediation:** Administrators may believe a threat has been mitigated while the deleted user remains active within the system.\n\n**Endpoint Example:** Any endpoint accessible to authenticated users, including dashboards, administrative interfaces, user management pages, and API endpoints.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce (PoC)\n1. Create or use an existing user account.\n2. Log into the application using this account.\n3. From an administrative account, **delete** the logged-in user account.\n4. Observe that the target user remains authenticated.\n5. Verify that the user can still access protected functionality, invoke actions, and interact with the application as before.\n6. Confirm that the user only loses access after manually logging out (if they choose to do so).\n\n## Remediation\n- Immediately invalidate all active sessions when an account is **deleted**.\n- Enforce account status checks on every authenticated request, not only during login.\n- Introduce proper session expiration or account expiration mechanisms to prevent indefinite access.\n- Correct the backend logic flaw to ensure access control behavior aligns with intended security design and does not rely on unsafe trust assumptions.\n\n# Ready Video POC:\nhttps://mega.nz/file/7dlUTQAB#0oXOapF5XYN4DRRG1xYj6DajmuP72MpMdsHqbVBMmWw",
11+
"severity": [
12+
{
13+
"type": "CVSS_V3",
14+
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
15+
}
16+
],
17+
"affected": [
18+
{
19+
"package": {
20+
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
21+
"name": "ci4-cms-erp/ci4ms"
22+
},
23+
"ranges": [
24+
{
25+
"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
26+
"events": [
27+
{
28+
"introduced": "0"
29+
},
30+
{
31+
"fixed": "0.31.0.0"
32+
}
33+
]
34+
}
35+
],
36+
"database_specific": {
37+
"last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 0.28.6.0"
38+
}
39+
}
40+
],
41+
"references": [
42+
{
43+
"type": "WEB",
44+
"url": "https://github.com/ci4-cms-erp/ci4ms/security/advisories/GHSA-4vxv-4xq4-p84h"
45+
},
46+
{
47+
"type": "PACKAGE",
48+
"url": "https://github.com/ci4-cms-erp/ci4ms"
49+
}
50+
],
51+
"database_specific": {
52+
"cwe_ids": [
53+
"CWE-1254",
54+
"CWE-284",
55+
"CWE-613"
56+
],
57+
"severity": "HIGH",
58+
"github_reviewed": true,
59+
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-01T22:08:29Z",
60+
"nvd_published_at": null
61+
}
62+
}

‎advisories/github-reviewed/2026/04/GHSA-8fq3-c5w3-pj3q/GHSA-8fq3-c5w3-pj3q.json‎

Lines changed: 62 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
1+
{
2+
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
3+
"id": "GHSA-8fq3-c5w3-pj3q",
4+
"modified": "2026-04-01T22:09:39Z",
5+
"published": "2026-04-01T22:09:39Z",
6+
"aliases": [
7+
"CVE-2026-34572"
8+
],
9+
"summary": "CI4MS: Account Deactivation Module Grants Full Persistent Unauthorized Access for All‑Roles via Improper Session Invalidation (Logic Flaw)",
10+
"details": "## Summary\n### Vulnerability: Improper Session Invalidation on Account Deactivation (Broken Access Control / Logic Flaw)\n- This vulnerability is caused by a backend logic flaw that maintains a false trust assumption that already-authenticated users remain trustworthy, even after their accounts are explicitly deactivated. As a result, administrative security actions do not behave as intended, allowing persistent unauthorized access.\n\n### Description\nThe application fails to immediately revoke active user sessions when an account is deactivated. Due to a logic flaw in the backend design, account state changes are enforced only during authentication (login), not for already-established sessions.\n\nThe system implicitly assumes that authenticated users remain trusted for the lifetime of their session. There is no session expiration or account expiration mechanism in place, causing deactivated accounts to retain indefinite access until the user manually logs out. This behavior breaks the intended access control policy and results in persistent unauthorized access, representing a critical security flaw.\n\n### Affected Functionality\n- User session management and authentication logic\n- Account deactivation mechanism\n- All authenticated endpoints, including administrative and content interfaces\n\n### Attack Scenario\n- A user logs into the application.\n- An administrator deactivates the user account.\n- The user remains fully logged in and can continue performing all actions allowed by their role indefinitely, as there is no session expiration.\n- The user can continue invoking backend methods, triggering application actions, accessing sensitive interfaces (including user management if permitted), and interacting with the system as if the account were still active.\n- Access is only lost if the user manually logs out, which may never occur.\n\n### Impact\n- Unauthorized Continued Access: Deactivated users retain full access indefinitely, violating intended access control and expected security behavior.\n- Bypass of Administrative Controls: Administrative actions (deactivation) fail to immediately restrict active sessions.\n- Logic Flaw Resulting in Broken Behavior: Backend authorization logic relies on a flawed trust assumption that authenticated users remain valid, enforcing account state only at login.\n- Full Functional Access Retained: Deactivated users can continue invoking application methods, executing actions, interacting with protected endpoints, and using the system exactly as before being deactivated.\n- Privilege Abuse: Users with elevated roles (moderator, editor, administrator) can continue performing privileged actions after account deactivation, including accessing user management interfaces and modifying application state.\n- Service Disruption Potential: Persistent access allows attackers to disrupt services, manipulate content, or interfere with normal application operations.\n- Attack Persistence: Attackers can maintain access indefinitely, increasing the risk of data exfiltration, unauthorized modifications, or further privilege escalation.\n- False Sense of Remediation: Administrators may believe a threat has been mitigated while the deactivated user remains active within the system.\n\nEndpoint Example: Any endpoint accessible to authenticated users, including dashboards, administrative interfaces, user management pages, and API endpoints.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce (PoC)\n1. Create or use an existing user account.\n2. Log into the application using this account.\n3. From an administrative account, deactivate the logged-in user account.\n4. Observe that the target user remains authenticated.\n5. Verify that the user can still access protected functionality, invoke actions, and interact with the application as before.\n6. Confirm that the user only loses access after manually logging out (if they choose to do so).\n\n## Remediation\n- Immediately invalidate all active sessions when an account is deactivated.\n- Enforce account status checks on every authenticated request, not only during login.\n- Introduce proper session expiration or account expiration mechanisms to prevent indefinite access.\n- Correct the backend logic flaw to ensure access control behavior aligns with intended security design and does not rely on unsafe trust assumptions.\n\n# Ready Video POC:\nhttps://mega.nz/file/zJkhwCII#G1-TecKmNBJmEeBS0ExsAY_RXEmAl3QqMqu4t5oy844",
11+
"severity": [
12+
{
13+
"type": "CVSS_V3",
14+
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
15+
}
16+
],
17+
"affected": [
18+
{
19+
"package": {
20+
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
21+
"name": "ci4-cms-erp/ci4ms"
22+
},
23+
"ranges": [
24+
{
25+
"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
26+
"events": [
27+
{
28+
"introduced": "0"
29+
},
30+
{
31+
"fixed": "0.31.0.0"
32+
}
33+
]
34+
}
35+
],
36+
"database_specific": {
37+
"last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 0.28.6.0"
38+
}
39+
}
40+
],
41+
"references": [
42+
{
43+
"type": "WEB",
44+
"url": "https://github.com/ci4-cms-erp/ci4ms/security/advisories/GHSA-8fq3-c5w3-pj3q"
45+
},
46+
{
47+
"type": "PACKAGE",
48+
"url": "https://github.com/ci4-cms-erp/ci4ms"
49+
}
50+
],
51+
"database_specific": {
52+
"cwe_ids": [
53+
"CWE-1254",
54+
"CWE-284",
55+
"CWE-613"
56+
],
57+
"severity": "HIGH",
58+
"github_reviewed": true,
59+
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-01T22:09:39Z",
60+
"nvd_published_at": null
61+
}
62+
}

‎advisories/github-reviewed/2026/04/GHSA-fc4p-p49v-r948/GHSA-fc4p-p49v-r948.json‎

Lines changed: 60 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
1+
{
2+
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
3+
"id": "GHSA-fc4p-p49v-r948",
4+
"modified": "2026-04-01T22:09:03Z",
5+
"published": "2026-04-01T22:09:03Z",
6+
"aliases": [
7+
"CVE-2026-34571"
8+
],
9+
"summary": "CI4MS: Stored Cross‑Site Scripting (Stored XSS) in Backend User Management Allows Session Hijacking and Full Administrative Account Compromise",
10+
"details": "### Summary\n\nA critical Stored Cross-Site Scripting (Stored XSS) vulnerability exists in the backend user management functionality. The application fails to properly sanitize user-controlled input before rendering it in the administrative interface, allowing attackers to inject persistent JavaScript code. This results in automatic execution whenever backend users access the affected page, enabling session hijacking, privilege escalation, and full administrative account compromise.\n\n---\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerability resides in the backend user creation feature accessible via:\n\n```\n/backend/users\n```\n\nUser-supplied input in the **name** and **surname** fields is stored without proper validation or sanitization. When this data is later rendered in the backend users listing page, it is injected directly into the HTML without output encoding.\n\nBecause of this, attackers can embed malicious JavaScript payloads that execute in the context of authenticated backend users.\n\nThis indicates missing contextual output escaping (e.g., HTML encoding) and insufficient input sanitization, leading to persistent script execution.\n\nThe vulnerability is particularly severe because:\n\n* The payload is stored in the database (persistent XSS).\n* The script executes automatically on page load.\n* The affected page appears to be an administrative/backend interface, increasing the risk of privilege escalation.\n\n---\n\n### PoC\n\nSteps to reproduce:\n\n1. Navigate to:\n\n```\nhttp://localhost:8080/backend/users\n```\n\n2. Click **Add New User**.\n\n3. Create a new user.\n\n4. In the **name** and **surname** fields, insert the following payload:\n\n```\nadnan\"><img src=1 onerror=alert(document.cookie)><<e>img src=1 onerror=alert(document.cookie)>\n```\n\n5. Save the user.\n\n6. After saving, a popup displaying cookies will appear, demonstrating JavaScript execution.\n\n7. Revisit:\n\n```\nhttp://localhost:8080/backend/users\n```\n\n8. The popup automatically triggers again, confirming that the malicious script is stored and executed persistently.\n<img width=\"1534\" height=\"834\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/83f3d124-cf2e-472d-87cc-8c668ea81cba\" />\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\nSeverity: **Critical**\n\nThis vulnerability enables:\n\n* Persistent execution of attacker-controlled JavaScript in privileged backend contexts.\n* Theft of session cookies, potentially leading to full account takeover.\n* Unauthorized actions performed on behalf of administrators (CSRF-like behavior via XSS).\n* Privilege escalation if a high-privilege user views the page.\n* Injection of keyloggers, credential harvesting scripts, or malicious redirects.\n* Full compromise of backend administrative functionality depending on role permissions.\n\nSince the payload executes automatically without user interaction once stored, exploitation requires minimal effort and can impact all backend users.",
11+
"severity": [
12+
{
13+
"type": "CVSS_V3",
14+
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"
15+
}
16+
],
17+
"affected": [
18+
{
19+
"package": {
20+
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
21+
"name": "ci4-cms-erp/ci4ms"
22+
},
23+
"ranges": [
24+
{
25+
"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
26+
"events": [
27+
{
28+
"introduced": "0"
29+
},
30+
{
31+
"fixed": "0.31.0.0"
32+
}
33+
]
34+
}
35+
],
36+
"database_specific": {
37+
"last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 0.28.6.0"
38+
}
39+
}
40+
],
41+
"references": [
42+
{
43+
"type": "WEB",
44+
"url": "https://github.com/ci4-cms-erp/ci4ms/security/advisories/GHSA-fc4p-p49v-r948"
45+
},
46+
{
47+
"type": "PACKAGE",
48+
"url": "https://github.com/ci4-cms-erp/ci4ms"
49+
}
50+
],
51+
"database_specific": {
52+
"cwe_ids": [
53+
"CWE-79"
54+
],
55+
"severity": "CRITICAL",
56+
"github_reviewed": true,
57+
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-01T22:09:03Z",
58+
"nvd_published_at": null
59+
}
60+
}

0 commit comments

Comments
 (0)