+ "details": "## Summary\n\nIP Restriction Middleware in Hono is vulnerable to an IP address validation bypass. The `IPV4_REGEX` pattern and `convertIPv4ToBinary` function in `src/utils/ipaddr.ts` do not properly validate that IPv4 octet values are within the valid range of 0-255, allowing attackers to craft malformed IP addresses that bypass IP-based access controls.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability exists in two components:\n\n1. **Permissive regex pattern:** The `IPV4_REGEX (/^[0-9]{0,3}\\.[0-9]{0,3}\\.[0-9]{0,3}\\.[0-9]{0,3}$/)` accepts octet values greater than 255 (e.g., `999`).\n2. **Unsafe binary conversion:** The `convertIPv4ToBinary` function does not validate octet ranges before performing bitwise operations. When an octet exceeds 255, it overflows into adjacent octets during the bit-shift calculation.\n\nFor example, the IP address `1.2.2.355` is accepted and converts to the same binary value as 1.2.3.99:\n\n* `355` = `256 + 99` = `0x163`\n* After bit-shifting: `(1 << 24) + (2 << 16) + (2 << 8) + 355` = `0x01020363` = `1.2.3.99`\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can bypass IP-based restrictions by crafting malformed IP addresses:\n\n* **Blocklist bypass:** If `1.2.3.0/24` is blocked, an attacker can use `1.2.2.355` (or similar) to bypass the restriction.\n* **Allowlist bypass:** Requests from unauthorized IP ranges may be incorrectly permitted.\n\nThis is exploitable when the application relies on client-provided IP addresses (e.g., `X-Forwarded-For header`) for access control decisions.\n\n## Affected Components\n\n* IP Restriction Middleware\n* `src/utils/ipaddr.ts`: `IPV4_REGEX`, `convertIPv4ToBinary`, `distinctRemoteAddr`",
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