You signed in with another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You signed out in another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You switched accounts on another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.Dismiss alert
Forge's implementation agents modify repository workspaces, while trusted Forge code owns commits, pushes, PR creation, and Jira/GitHub mutations. Code changes need one fail-closed validation boundary immediately before Git push.
This issue should not recreate Fullsend's artifact upload/download pipeline: Forge commonly uses a bind-mounted workspace or shared PVC. Driver-specific transfer validation belongs to drivers that actually transfer archives or files.
Proposed solution
Add a trusted pre-push gate in GitOperations that validates repository changes against the trusted base revision:
protected exact/glob paths sourced from Forge configuration or the base revision
unsafe symlinks and Git paths that escape or ambiguously resolve outside the repository
This boundary protects Git publication. Agent-derived Jira/GitHub text is validated by its originating workflow node before the trusted integration client is called.
Acceptance criteria
Both synchronous and asynchronous Forge push paths use the same gate.
Validation compares against a trusted origin/merge base.
Protected paths support Forge defaults and trusted per-repository configuration.
Unsafe symlinks/path resolution and bounded-size violations fail closed.
Missing or malformed required policy/base state fails closed.
Problem
Forge's implementation agents modify repository workspaces, while trusted Forge code owns commits, pushes, PR creation, and Jira/GitHub mutations. Code changes need one fail-closed validation boundary immediately before Git push.
This issue should not recreate Fullsend's artifact upload/download pipeline: Forge commonly uses a bind-mounted workspace or shared PVC. Driver-specific transfer validation belongs to drivers that actually transfer archives or files.
Proposed solution
Add a trusted pre-push gate in
GitOperationsthat validates repository changes against the trusted base revision:This boundary protects Git publication. Agent-derived Jira/GitHub text is validated by its originating workflow node before the trusted integration client is called.
Acceptance criteria
Related issues
Estimate
AI-assisted: 3–5 engineering days, excluding #77.