docs: nit updates to security.md (#1240)

🏠 Remote-Dev: homespace

Author: OctavianGuzu

docs/security.md

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
   - Is designed for automation workflows where user permissions are already restricted by the workflow's permission scope
   - When set, Claude does a best-effort scrub of Anthropic, cloud, and GitHub Actions secrets from subprocess environments. On Linux runners with bubblewrap available, subprocesses additionally run with PID-namespace isolation. This reduces but does not eliminate prompt injection risk — keep workflow permissions minimal and validate all outputs. Set `CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB: 0` in your workflow or job `env:` block to opt out.
   - Optionally set `CLAUDE_CODE_SCRIPT_CAPS` in your workflow `env:` block to limit how many times Claude can call specific scripts per run. Value is JSON: `{"script-name.sh": maxCalls}`. Example: `CLAUDE_CODE_SCRIPT_CAPS: '{"edit-issue-labels.sh":2}'` allows at most 2 calls to `edit-issue-labels.sh`. Useful for write-capable helper scripts.
-  - When using `allowed_non_write_users`, always pass `github_token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}`. The auto-generated workflow token is scoped to the job's declared permissions and expires when the job completes. **Do not use a personal access token** — a static token does not rotate between runs, and depending on the tools allowed via `claude_args`, the model could be used to recover part or all of it. We recommend restricting allowed tools (e.g. `claude_args: '--allowedTools "Bash(gh issue view:*)"'`) to the minimum required when using `allowed_non_write_users`.
+  - When using `allowed_non_write_users`, always pass `github_token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}`. The auto-generated workflow token is scoped to the job's declared permissions and expires when the job completes. **Do not use a personal access token** — a static token does not rotate between runs and could be partially or fully recovered over time via prompt injection. Restricting allowed tools via `claude_args` reduces the rate of recovery but may not eliminate the risk. We recommend restricting allowed tools (e.g. `claude_args: '--allowedTools "Bash(gh issue view:*)"'`) to the minimum required when using `allowed_non_write_users`.
 - **Token Permissions**: The GitHub app receives only a short-lived token scoped specifically to the repository it's operating in
 - **No Cross-Repository Access**: Each action invocation is limited to the repository where it was triggered
 - **Limited Scope**: The token cannot access other repositories or perform actions beyond the configured permissions