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+# Exercise 0x25 — KV Cache Reuse (Latent Briefing Concept)
+
+## Objective
+
+Demonstrate how prompt caching enables KV cache reuse across multiple queries — the same core mechanism described in Ramp's "Latent Briefing" research.
+
+## Background
+
+**Paper:** https://labs.ramp.com/research/latent-briefing-kv-cache
+
+In multi-agent systems, an orchestrator builds rich reasoning context over many calls. Passing this as raw text to worker agents causes token explosion. Latent Briefing solves this by operating directly on KV cache representations — pre-computing them once and sharing them across workers.
+
+Anthropic's prompt caching is the production API for this: mark a context block with `cache_control`, and the KV cache is computed once then reused on subsequent calls.
+
+### Concept Mapping
+
+| Paper Concept | Exercise Equivalent |
+|---|---|
+| Orchestrator builds shared context | Large security policy in system prompt |
+| KV cache pre-computation | `cache_control: {"type": "ephemeral"}` |
+| Workers query shared representations | Multiple queries reuse cached context |
+| Token reduction metrics | `cache_read_input_tokens` vs `cache_creation_input_tokens` |
+
+## Instructions
+
+### 1. Run the Demo
+
+```sh
+python extras/exercise-25/kv_cache_demo.py
+```
+
+### 2. Observe the Metrics
+
+When caching is active:
+- **Query 1:** `cache_creation_input_tokens` > 0 (KV cache is computed)
+- **Query 2 & 3:** `cache_read_input_tokens` > 0 (KV cache is reused)
+
+Cached tokens are billed at 90% discount on reads, with a 25% write premium on creation.
+
+### Bedrock Note
+
+Cross-region inference profiles (`us.anthropic.*`) do not support prompt caching because requests route across multiple regions, preventing per-region KV cache reuse. Cache metrics will show 0 in this configuration. The `cache_control` structure in the script is production-correct — to see live metrics, use either:
+- A single-region Bedrock model ID (requires provisioned throughput)
+- The direct Anthropic API with an `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`
+
+### 3. Experiment (Optional)
+
+- Remove the `cache_control` block and compare — all calls pay full input token cost
+- Add more queries to observe continued cache hits within the 5-minute TTL
+- Increase the policy size and observe how cache savings scale
+- Try setting cache TTL to longer durations for persistent caching
diff --git a/scripts/extras/exercise-25/kv_cache_demo.py b/scripts/extras/exercise-25/kv_cache_demo.py
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+"""
+Exercise 25: KV Cache Reuse Demo (Latent Briefing Concept)
+
+Demonstrates how Anthropic's prompt caching reuses KV cache representations
+across multiple queries — the same core mechanism described in Ramp's
+"Latent Briefing" paper (https://labs.ramp.com/research/latent-briefing-kv-cache).
+
+The large security policy is cached on the first call. Subsequent calls reuse
+the cached KV representations, avoiding redundant computation.
+"""
+
+import os
+from dotenv import load_dotenv
+from anthropic import AnthropicBedrock
+
+load_dotenv()
+
+client = AnthropicBedrock(
+    aws_region=os.environ.get("AWS_DEFAULT_REGION", "us-east-1"),
+)
+
+MODEL = "us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0"
+
+SECURITY_POLICY = """\
+ACME CORPORATION — APPLICATION SECURITY POLICY v4.2
+
+1. AUTHENTICATION & ACCESS CONTROL
+All services must implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for user-facing
+endpoints. API-to-API communication must use short-lived tokens (maximum 15-minute
+lifetime) issued by the central identity provider. Service accounts must never use
+static credentials. OAuth 2.0 with PKCE is the required flow for all browser-based
+clients. Session tokens must be rotated after privilege escalation events (e.g.,
+entering an admin panel). Failed authentication attempts must trigger progressive
+delays: 1s after 3 failures, 5s after 5, and account lockout after 10.
+
+2. SECRETS & CREDENTIAL MANAGEMENT
+All secrets must be stored in HashiCorp Vault or AWS Secrets Manager. Hardcoded
+credentials in source code are a P0 finding and must be remediated within 24 hours.
+Database credentials must be rotated every 30 days via automated rotation policies.
+API keys issued to external partners must have per-endpoint scoping and rate limits.
+TLS certificates must use 2048-bit RSA or P-256 ECDSA minimum and auto-renew 30 days
+before expiry. SSH keys must use Ed25519; RSA keys below 4096 bits are prohibited.
+
+3. DATA CLASSIFICATION & HANDLING
+Data is classified into four tiers: Public, Internal, Confidential, and Restricted.
+PII (names, emails, SSNs, payment info) is always Restricted. Restricted data must be
+encrypted at rest with AES-256-GCM and in transit with TLS 1.3. Internal data may use
+TLS 1.2 minimum. Logs must never contain Restricted data — structured logging with
+redaction filters is required. Data retention: Restricted=1 year, Confidential=3 years,
+Internal=5 years, Public=indefinite. Cross-border transfers of Restricted data require
+legal review and must comply with GDPR, CCPA, and relevant local regulations.
+
+4. SECURE DEVELOPMENT LIFECYCLE
+All code must pass SAST scanning (Semgrep + CodeQL) before merge. DAST scanning runs
+nightly against staging environments. Dependency scanning (SCA) blocks PRs that
+introduce critical/high CVEs with known exploits. Container images must be rebuilt
+weekly to pick up base image patches. Developers must complete secure coding training
+annually — OWASP Top 10, injection prevention, and authentication design. Threat
+modeling is required for all new features handling Restricted data or modifying
+authentication flows.
+
+5. INCIDENT RESPONSE PROCEDURES
+Security incidents are classified P0-P3. P0 (active breach or data exfiltration):
+15-minute initial response, all-hands war room, executive notification within 1 hour.
+P1 (confirmed vulnerability being exploited): 1-hour response, designated responder
+team. P2 (vulnerability identified, not exploited): 24-hour triage, patch within 7
+days. P3 (informational/hardening): tracked in backlog, addressed within 30 days. All
+incidents require a post-mortem within 5 business days. Root cause analysis must
+identify systemic fixes, not just immediate patches. Communication to affected users
+must occur within 72 hours for any P0/P1 involving PII.
+
+6. NETWORK SEGMENTATION & INFRASTRUCTURE
+Production, staging, and development environments must be fully isolated — no shared
+databases, no shared credentials, no network paths between them. Internal services
+communicate via mTLS within a service mesh. Public-facing endpoints must sit behind a
+WAF with OWASP CRS ruleset enabled. Egress traffic must be explicitly allowlisted —
+default-deny. Database access from application tiers must go through a connection
+pooler with query parameterization enforced at the driver level.
+
+7. LOGGING, MONITORING & ALERTING
+All authentication events, authorization failures, and data access to Restricted
+resources must be logged with structured fields: timestamp, actor, action, resource,
+outcome, source IP. Logs must be shipped to the SIEM within 60 seconds. Alerting rules:
+>5 failed auth attempts from a single IP in 60s triggers investigation, any access to
+Restricted data outside business hours triggers P2 review, any disabled WAF rule
+triggers immediate P1. Log retention: 90 days hot, 1 year cold, 7 years archive for
+compliance. Tampering with audit logs is a terminable offense.
+
+8. THIRD-PARTY & SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY
+All third-party libraries must be pinned to exact versions with integrity hashes.
+Transitive dependency updates require automated testing before promotion. Vendors with
+access to Restricted data must complete SOC 2 Type II review annually. Open-source
+components must have active maintenance (commit within 6 months) or an approved
+exception. Container base images must come from the approved registry — no pulling
+directly from Docker Hub in production builds.
+
+9. API SECURITY STANDARDS
+All APIs must implement rate limiting: 100 requests/minute for authenticated users, 20
+requests/minute for unauthenticated endpoints. GraphQL endpoints must enforce query
+depth limits (max 10) and complexity scoring (max 1000 points). REST APIs must validate
+Content-Type headers and reject unexpected media types. All API responses must include
+security headers: X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, X-Frame-Options: DENY,
+Strict-Transport-Security with max-age of at least 31536000. CORS policies must
+explicitly whitelist allowed origins — wildcard (*) is prohibited for any endpoint
+handling authenticated requests. API versioning is mandatory; deprecated versions must
+log warnings for 90 days before removal. Input validation must occur at the API gateway
+layer using JSON Schema validation with strict mode enabled. File upload endpoints must
+validate MIME types server-side, enforce size limits (50MB default), and scan with
+ClamAV before storage. WebSocket connections must authenticate on handshake and
+re-validate tokens every 15 minutes.
+
+10. MOBILE & CLIENT-SIDE SECURITY
+Mobile applications must implement certificate pinning with backup pins. Local storage
+of Restricted data requires hardware-backed encryption (Keychain/Keystore). Binary
+obfuscation is required for release builds. Debug builds must never be distributed
+outside the development team. Client-side validation must always be duplicated
+server-side — client validation is for UX only, never for security. JavaScript
+applications must implement Subresource Integrity (SRI) for all third-party scripts.
+Content Security Policy must be enforced in report-and-enforce mode with nonce-based
+script allowlisting. Local storage and session storage must never contain tokens or PII.
+"""
+
+system_blocks = [
+    {
+        "type": "text",
+        "text": "You are an application security engineer. Answer questions using the security policy below.",
+    },
+    {
+        "type": "text",
+        "text": SECURITY_POLICY,
+        "cache_control": {"type": "ephemeral"},
+    },
+]
+
+queries = [
+    "What are the authentication requirements for API-to-API communication and browser clients?",
+    "Describe the credential rotation and secrets management requirements.",
+    "What are the incident response SLAs for a P0 vs P1 security incident?",
+]
+
+print("=" * 60)
+print("Exercise 25: KV Cache Reuse Demo (Latent Briefing Concept)")
+print("=" * 60)
+print()
+print(f"Security policy size: ~{len(SECURITY_POLICY.split())} words")
+print(f"Sending {len(queries)} queries against the same cached context...")
+print()
+
+for i, query in enumerate(queries, 1):
+    print(f"--- Query {i} ---")
+    print(f"Q: {query}")
+    print()
+
+    response = client.messages.create(
+        model=MODEL,
+        max_tokens=512,
+        system=system_blocks,
+        messages=[{"role": "user", "content": query}],
+    )
+
+    print(f"A: {response.content[0].text[:300]}")
+    print()
+
+    usage = response.usage
+    cache_created = getattr(usage, "cache_creation_input_tokens", 0) or 0
+    cache_read = getattr(usage, "cache_read_input_tokens", 0) or 0
+
+    print(f"  Input tokens:          {usage.input_tokens}")
+    print(f"  Output tokens:         {usage.output_tokens}")
+    print(f"  Cache creation tokens: {cache_created}")
+    print(f"  Cache read tokens:     {cache_read}")
+
+    if cache_created > 0:
+        print("  --> KV cache CREATED (one-time cost)")
+    if cache_read > 0:
+        print("  --> KV cache READ (reuse! no recomputation)")
+    print()
+
+print("=" * 60)
+print("TAKEAWAY: When prompt caching is active, calls 2 and 3 show")
+print("cache_read tokens instead of cache_creation tokens. The model")
+print("reuses pre-computed KV representations — the same mechanism")
+print("Ramp's Latent Briefing paper uses to share context between")
+print("orchestrator and workers.")
+print()
+print("NOTE: Cross-region inference profiles (us.anthropic.*) do not")
+print("support prompt caching — requests route across regions, making")
+print("per-region KV caching impossible. To see live cache metrics,")
+print("use a single-region model ID or the direct Anthropic API.")
+print("The cache_control structure here is production-correct.")
+print("=" * 60)