- OpenZero can operate with elevated local privileges. Version 7.1 retains tamper-evident ethics locks, encrypted local vault files, and signed Hive contributions, but a system owner with full disk access can still replace files. Treat the platform as hardened and auditable, not magically immutable.
+ OpenZero performs operator-approved actions only within the deployed service permissions; automatic privilege escalation is blocked in production. Version 7.1 retains tamper-evident ethics locks, encrypted local vault files, and signed Hive contributions, but self-editing and other writable state remain high risk because a system owner with full disk access can still replace files. Treat the platform as hardened and auditable, not magically immutable.
diff --git a/openzero/tests/test_security_hardening.py b/openzero/tests/test_security_hardening.py
index f313fb3..003fd4d 100644
--- a/openzero/tests/test_security_hardening.py
+++ b/openzero/tests/test_security_hardening.py
@@ -202,6 +202,24 @@ def test_manual_has_no_shared_default_or_root_runtime_claim(self):
self.assertIn("unique operator account and password", manual)
self.assertIn("no automatic privilege escalation", manual)
+ def test_public_page_matches_the_production_privilege_boundary(self):
+ public_page = (OPENZERO_ROOT / "index.html").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+ for retired_claim in (
+ "ROOT@OPENZERO:~#",
+ "UNCENSORED / DNA MATH",
+ "ROOT SHELL / BASH",
+ "operate with elevated local privileges",
+ ):
+ self.assertNotIn(retired_claim, public_page)
+ for required_copy in (
+ "ZERO@OPENZERO:~$",
+ "OPERATOR POLICY / LOCAL AUDIT",
+ "APPROVAL-GATED LOCAL TOOLS",
+ "automatic privilege escalation is blocked in production",
+ "self-editing and other writable state remain high risk",
+ ):
+ self.assertIn(required_copy, public_page)
+
class DoctorModelSelectionTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_hugging_face_ollama_reference_is_local(self):