diff --git a/crates/shell/src/clients.rs b/crates/shell/src/clients.rs
index 256048b3..63c62a34 100644
--- a/crates/shell/src/clients.rs
+++ b/crates/shell/src/clients.rs
@@ -970,6 +970,11 @@ pub fn sandbox_policy(app: &AppDef, root: Option<&Path>, program: &Path, hub_por
     roots.sort();
     roots.dedup();
     let mut policy = crate::sandbox::Policy::for_app(native, paths.jail, paths.secrets, &home, roots, hub_port);
+    // The host's private directories stay closed whatever the manifest
+    // grants (G6): the OctoSense home (peer host tokens, every app's jail
+    // and secrets), the storage roots and the kernel's core dir.
+    let core = crate::ai_host::core_dir(None);
+    policy.private = crate::sandbox::host_private_dirs(&crate::octosense::paths::home(), layout.apps_root(), layout.secrets_root(), core.as_deref());
     // Cargo reads `.cargo/config.toml` from its working directory up (the
     // manifest's directory, else the checkout): every `[env]` host variable
     // it would hand the app is taken back out.
diff --git a/crates/shell/src/sandbox/linux.rs b/crates/shell/src/sandbox/linux.rs
index 3933ca08..d0248122 100644
--- a/crates/shell/src/sandbox/linux.rs
+++ b/crates/shell/src/sandbox/linux.rs
@@ -9,6 +9,16 @@
 //! allowed only from the program's roots (and the system's, when
 //! `processes` is true).
 //!
+//! **The host's private directories** ([`Policy::private`]: the OctoSense
+//! home, the kernel's core dir) stay closed whatever a grant opens. Landlock
+//! cannot deny beneath an allowed directory, so a grant that contains one
+//! (the Terminal's `home:rw`) is split: each entry of the granted directory
+//! is granted on its own, recursing only into directories on the way to a
+//! private one, which get no right at all. The app's own jail and secrets
+//! are granted by themselves. The limits of that split: entries created in
+//! a split directory after the app started (a new file directly in `~`) are
+//! not covered, and the directories on the way cannot be listed.
+//!
 //! seccomp refuses, with `EPERM`, what no process app needs: `ptrace`,
 //! `process_vm_readv/writev`, `perf_event_open`, `bpf`, `userfaultfd`,
 //! `kexec_load`, mounts, namespaces and the kernel keyring; with
@@ -158,7 +168,41 @@ pub fn rules(policy: &Policy, abi: u32, via_cargo: bool) -> Vec<Rule> {
             add(program.clone(), all);
         }
     }
-    out
+    let own = [policy.jail.clone(), policy.secrets.clone()];
+    let mut split = Vec::new();
+    for rule in out {
+        if own.contains(&rule.path) {
+            split.push(rule);
+        } else {
+            around_private(rule, &policy.private, &mut split);
+        }
+    }
+    split
+}
+
+/// `rule`, minus the private directories: dropped when it lies inside one;
+/// when it contains one, replaced by a rule per entry of its directory,
+/// recursing toward the private ones (which get nothing).
+pub fn around_private(rule: Rule, private: &[PathBuf], out: &mut Vec<Rule>) {
+    if private.iter().any(|p| rule.path.starts_with(p)) {
+        return;
+    }
+    if !private.iter().any(|p| p.starts_with(&rule.path)) {
+        out.push(rule);
+        return;
+    }
+    let Ok(entries) = std::fs::read_dir(&rule.path) else { return };
+    for entry in entries.flatten() {
+        let path = entry.path();
+        // Landlock grants what a link resolves to: a link into (or above) a
+        // private directory gets nothing.
+        let real = std::fs::canonicalize(&path).unwrap_or_else(|_| path.clone());
+        if real != path && private.iter().any(|p| real.starts_with(p) || p.starts_with(&real)) {
+            continue;
+        }
+        let access = if path.is_dir() { rule.access } else { rule.access & FILE_RIGHTS };
+        around_private(Rule { path, access }, private, out);
+    }
 }
 
 /// The seccomp program for `processes` on this architecture, `None` where
diff --git a/crates/shell/src/sandbox/macos.rs b/crates/shell/src/sandbox/macos.rs
index d2663110..7014d6c5 100644
--- a/crates/shell/src/sandbox/macos.rs
+++ b/crates/shell/src/sandbox/macos.rs
@@ -6,8 +6,11 @@
 //! (libraries, fonts, the window server, Metal's shader cache) and closes
 //! the person's data roots except the grants. In SBPL the last matching
 //! rule wins, so the order below is the policy: close the roots, reopen the
-//! ancestors' metadata (paths must resolve), the program read-only, then
-//! the jail, secrets and `external` grants.
+//! ancestors' metadata (paths must resolve), the program read-only, the
+//! jail, secrets and `external` grants; then close the host's private
+//! directories again ([`Policy::private`]: the OctoSense home, the kernel's
+//! core dir), whatever a grant opened, and reopen only the app's own jail
+//! and secrets inside them.
 
 use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
 
@@ -73,6 +76,27 @@ pub fn profile(policy: &Policy) -> String {
         out.push_str(&format!("(allow file-read*{})\n", subpaths(&ro)));
     }
     out.push_str(&format!(";; its jail, its secrets and external grants\n(allow file-read* file-write*{})\n", subpaths(&rw)));
+    let private: Vec<PathBuf> = policy.private.iter().map(|p| resolved(p)).collect();
+    if !private.is_empty() {
+        let own = [resolved(&policy.jail), resolved(&policy.secrets)];
+        out.push_str(&format!(
+            ";; the host's private directories stay closed whatever a grant opened (peer tokens, other apps, the kernel)\n(deny file-read* file-write*{})\n",
+            subpaths(&private)
+        ));
+        let mut inside: Vec<PathBuf> = Vec::new();
+        for path in &own {
+            for a in ancestors(path) {
+                if private.iter().any(|root| a.starts_with(root)) && !inside.contains(&a) {
+                    inside.push(a);
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        if !inside.is_empty() {
+            let lits: String = inside.iter().map(|p| format!(" (literal {})", quote(p))).collect();
+            out.push_str(&format!("(allow file-read-metadata{lits})\n"));
+        }
+        out.push_str(&format!(";; only its own jail and secrets inside them\n(allow file-read* file-write*{})\n", subpaths(&own)));
+    }
     if policy.network == Network::None {
         out.push_str(&format!(
             ";; network: the shell's hub only\n(deny network*)\n(allow network-outbound (remote ip \"localhost:{}\"))\n",
diff --git a/crates/shell/src/sandbox/mod.rs b/crates/shell/src/sandbox/mod.rs
index 0efc15ee..4ae6127a 100644
--- a/crates/shell/src/sandbox/mod.rs
+++ b/crates/shell/src/sandbox/mod.rs
@@ -90,6 +90,12 @@ pub struct Policy {
     pub program: Vec<PathBuf>,
     /// The person's data roots: closed except for the grants above.
     pub protected: Vec<PathBuf>,
+    /// The host's own private directories (the OctoSense home, the apps
+    /// and secrets roots, the kernel's core dir): closed LAST, after every
+    /// grant, so even a broad grant (the Terminal's `home:rw`) never reaches
+    /// peer host tokens, other apps' jails and secrets, or kernel data. Only
+    /// the app's own jail and secrets are opened again inside them.
+    pub private: Vec<PathBuf>,
     pub network: Network,
     /// The shell's hub port, reachable on loopback whatever `network` is.
     pub hub_port: u16,
@@ -171,6 +177,7 @@ impl Policy {
             external,
             program,
             protected,
+            private: Vec::new(),
             network: app.network,
             hub_port,
             processes: app.processes,
@@ -210,6 +217,35 @@ impl Policy {
     }
 }
 
+/// The host's private directories for a sandbox: the OctoSense home, the
+/// apps and secrets roots (they may live elsewhere), the kernel's core dir,
+/// and the kernel home around a `.octos` core dir. Each resolved, without
+/// duplicates.
+pub fn host_private_dirs(octosense_home: &Path, apps_root: &Path, secrets_root: &Path, core_dir: Option<&Path>) -> Vec<PathBuf> {
+    let mut out: Vec<PathBuf> = Vec::new();
+    let mut push = |p: &Path| {
+        if p.as_os_str().is_empty() || p.parent().is_none() {
+            return; // never the file system root
+        }
+        let p = p.to_path_buf();
+        if !out.contains(&p) {
+            out.push(p);
+        }
+    };
+    push(octosense_home);
+    push(apps_root);
+    push(secrets_root);
+    if let Some(core) = core_dir {
+        push(core);
+        if core.file_name().is_some_and(|n| n == ".octos") {
+            if let Some(kernel_home) = core.parent() {
+                push(kernel_home);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    out
+}
+
 /// Whether `OCTOSENSE_SANDBOX_NARROW` names `app` (see [`Policy::narrowed`]).
 pub fn narrowed_by_env(app: &str) -> bool {
     std::env::var("OCTOSENSE_SANDBOX_NARROW").map(|v| v.split(',').any(|a| a.trim() == app)).unwrap_or(false)
diff --git a/crates/shell/src/sandbox/tests.rs b/crates/shell/src/sandbox/tests.rs
index a6383389..fdc7a8bc 100644
--- a/crates/shell/src/sandbox/tests.rs
+++ b/crates/shell/src/sandbox/tests.rs
@@ -196,3 +196,121 @@ fn no_child_inherits_a_host_token_or_a_kernel_path() {
         assert!(!is_host_secret_var(name), "the child sees {line}");
     }
 }
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------- the OctoSense home (G6)
+
+/// A broad app (the Terminal's `home:rw`) whose scratch "home" also holds
+/// the OctoSense home and the kernel's core dir, as on a real machine.
+fn home_rw_with_octosense_home(root: &Path) -> Policy {
+    let octo = root.join(".octosense");
+    let jail = octo.join("apps/probe");
+    let secrets = octo.join("secrets/probe");
+    let mut p = jail_only(root, 1);
+    p.jail = jail;
+    p.secrets = secrets;
+    p.external = vec![(root.to_path_buf(), Access::ReadWrite)];
+    p.network = Network::Any;
+    p.processes = true;
+    p.private = host_private_dirs(&octo, &octo.join("apps"), &octo.join("secrets"), Some(&root.join("octos-home/.octos")));
+    p
+}
+
+#[cfg(unix)]
+#[test]
+fn home_rw_never_reaches_the_octosense_home_or_the_kernel() {
+    if !sandbox_works_here() {
+        eprintln!("no process sandbox on this machine; skipped");
+        return;
+    }
+    let scratch = Scratch::new("octohome");
+    let root = &scratch.0;
+    let octo = root.join(".octosense");
+    for dir in ["apps/probe", "apps/other", "secrets/probe", "secrets/other", "app-peers"] {
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(octo.join(dir)).unwrap();
+    }
+    std::fs::create_dir_all(root.join("octos-home/.octos")).unwrap();
+    std::fs::create_dir_all(root.join("Documents")).unwrap();
+    std::fs::write(root.join("Documents/note.txt"), "the person's note").unwrap();
+    std::fs::write(octo.join("apps/probe/mine.txt"), "mine").unwrap();
+    std::fs::write(octo.join("secrets/probe/key"), "its own secret").unwrap();
+    std::fs::write(octo.join("apps/other/theirs.txt"), "another app's").unwrap();
+    std::fs::write(octo.join("secrets/other/key"), "another app's secret").unwrap();
+    std::fs::write(octo.join("app-peers/rinx.token"), "peer-host-token").unwrap();
+    std::fs::write(octo.join("settings.json"), "{}").unwrap();
+    std::fs::write(root.join("octos-home/.octos/profile.json"), "kernel data").unwrap();
+    std::fs::write(root.join("octos-home/notes.md"), "kernel home").unwrap();
+    let policy = home_rw_with_octosense_home(root);
+
+    let cat = |p: PathBuf| run("/bin/cat", &[p.to_str().unwrap()], &policy);
+    let (ok, out) = cat(root.join("Documents/note.txt"));
+    assert!(ok && out.contains("the person's note"), "home:rw still reaches the person's files: {out}");
+    let (ok, out) = cat(octo.join("apps/probe/mine.txt"));
+    assert!(ok && out.contains("mine"), "its own jail: {out}");
+    let (ok, out) = cat(octo.join("secrets/probe/key"));
+    assert!(ok && out.contains("its own secret"), "its own secrets: {out}");
+    for (path, what) in [
+        (octo.join("app-peers/rinx.token"), "peer-host-token"),
+        (octo.join("apps/other/theirs.txt"), "another app's"),
+        (octo.join("secrets/other/key"), "another app's secret"),
+        (octo.join("settings.json"), "{}"),
+        (root.join("octos-home/.octos/profile.json"), "kernel data"),
+        (root.join("octos-home/notes.md"), "kernel home"),
+    ] {
+        let (ok, out) = cat(path.clone());
+        assert!(!ok && !out.contains(what), "{} must be refused: {out}", path.display());
+    }
+    let sh = |script: String| run("/bin/sh", &["-c", &script], &policy);
+    let (ok, out) = sh(format!("echo x > {}/app-peers/planted.token", octo.display()));
+    assert!(!ok, "nothing is written into the OctoSense home: {out}");
+    let (ok, out) = sh(format!("ls {}/apps", octo.display()));
+    assert!(!ok || !out.contains("other"), "other apps' jails are not even listed: {out}");
+    let (ok, out) = sh(format!("echo x > {}/apps/probe/written", octo.display()));
+    assert!(ok, "it writes in its own jail: {out}");
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn the_macos_profile_closes_the_octosense_home_after_every_grant() {
+    let root = Path::new("/nonexistent/home");
+    let p = home_rw_with_octosense_home(root);
+    let text = macos::profile(&p);
+    let grant = text.find("(allow file-read* file-write* (subpath \"/nonexistent/home/.octosense/apps/probe\") (subpath \"/nonexistent/home/.octosense/secrets/probe\") (subpath \"/nonexistent/home\"))").expect(&text);
+    let deny = text.find("(deny file-read* file-write* (subpath \"/nonexistent/home/.octosense\")").expect(&text);
+    let own = text.rfind("(allow file-read* file-write* (subpath \"/nonexistent/home/.octosense/apps/probe\") (subpath \"/nonexistent/home/.octosense/secrets/probe\"))").expect(&text);
+    assert!(grant < deny && deny < own, "home:rw, then the private deny, then only its own jail and secrets\n{text}");
+    for dir in ["/nonexistent/home/octos-home/.octos", "/nonexistent/home/octos-home"] {
+        assert!(text[deny..].contains(&format!("(subpath \"{dir}\")")), "{dir} is closed\n{text}");
+    }
+    // Nothing private: no extra rules.
+    let mut plain = p.clone();
+    plain.private.clear();
+    assert!(!macos::profile(&plain).contains("private directories"));
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn the_private_dirs_are_the_homes_roots_and_the_kernels() {
+    let octo = Path::new("/h/.octosense");
+    let dirs = host_private_dirs(octo, &octo.join("apps"), Path::new("/elsewhere/secrets"), Some(Path::new("/h/octos-home/.octos")));
+    assert_eq!(
+        dirs,
+        vec![octo.to_path_buf(), octo.join("apps"), PathBuf::from("/elsewhere/secrets"), PathBuf::from("/h/octos-home/.octos"), PathBuf::from("/h/octos-home")]
+    );
+    assert!(host_private_dirs(Path::new("/"), Path::new("/a"), Path::new("/b"), Some(Path::new("/core"))).iter().all(|p| p != Path::new("/")), "never the root");
+}
+
+#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
+#[test]
+fn landlock_splits_a_grant_around_the_private_dirs() {
+    let scratch = Scratch::new("split");
+    let root = &scratch.0;
+    let octo = root.join(".octosense");
+    std::fs::create_dir_all(octo.join("apps/probe")).unwrap();
+    std::fs::create_dir_all(root.join("Documents")).unwrap();
+    std::fs::write(root.join("top.txt"), "t").unwrap();
+    std::os::unix::fs::symlink(&octo, root.join("sneaky")).unwrap();
+    let mut out = Vec::new();
+    linux::around_private(linux::Rule { path: root.clone(), access: 0xfff }, &[octo.clone()], &mut out);
+    let paths: Vec<PathBuf> = out.iter().map(|r| r.path.clone()).collect();
+    assert!(paths.contains(&root.join("Documents")) && paths.contains(&root.join("top.txt")), "{paths:?}");
+    assert!(!paths.iter().any(|p| p.starts_with(&octo) || p == root), "{paths:?}");
+    assert!(!paths.contains(&root.join("sneaky")), "a link into a private dir gets nothing: {paths:?}");
+}